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NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-INTEREST

ON

INTEREST.-In

Burns Mortgage Co., Inc. v. Fried1 the plaintiff brought an action on
six promissory notes, each of which contained the following provision:
"With interest thereon (the principal sum) at the rate of 7% per annum from date until fully paid. Interest payable semi-annually. Deferred interest payments to bear interest from maturity at 10% per
annum, payable semi-annually." The court held that this provision
rendered the instruments nonnegotiable, and that the plaintiff was
not entitled to maintain the action, as indorsee of the notes, in his
own name.
The Negotiable Instruments Law provides in Section 1 that "An
instrument to be negotiable must conform to the following requirements: ... 2. Must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay
1

67 Fed. (2d)

352 (1933).
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a sum certain in money." Section 2 specifies that "The sum payable
is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is to be
paid: 1. With interest; or 2. By stated instalments; or 3. By stated
instalments, with a provision that upon default in payment of any
instalment or of interest, the whole shall become due. . . ." In the
above case the court reasoned that the instruments did not call for
the payment of a sum certain within the meaning of these provisions
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The amount to be collected on the
notes could not be determined by looking at their face, because it could
not be ascertained whether or not there had been a default in interest.
It was uncertain whether any interest was due on defaulted interest
or not.
Two recent cases are in accord with this Federal case. In First
National Bank of Miami Florida v. Bosler 2 the note in question provided that it was to be with interest thereon, payable semi-annually,
at the rate of 8% per annum from date until -paid. Deferred payments
were to bear interest from maturity at 10% per annum semi-annually.
The court held this instrument to be nonnegotiable, saying that "if
the note provides for the payment of a principal sum and interest, it
must clearly appear from the note itself, that at any given date the
two will always aggregate a sum certain." In New Miami Shores Corporation v. Duggan 3 a note providing for interest at 8% until paid,
and 10% on deferred payments was held nonnegotiable. In this case
the court made no comment upon the point; it merely cited First
National Bank of Miami Florida v. Bosler and based its decision entirely upon that case.
Courts in other jurisdictions have not taken the same view of this
question as is set forth in the above cases. In Continental & Commercial National Bank v. Jefferson 4 a note provided for interest at 8%
per annum, payable semi-annually from date until due. A further
provision was as follows: "Should any of the principal or interest not
be paid when due it shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum
payable semi-annually, until paid." It was argued by counsel that this
provision made the instrument nonnegotiable because there might or
might not be a default in interest before the maturity of the instrument. However, the court held the instrument to be negotiable. The
decision of the court was based on the following reasoning: "In a
note in this form, if the maker complies with his contract, there is
no question as to the amount necessary to pay the note at maturity
and if he does not so comply the matter is one of simple computation.
2
3

297 Pa. 353, 147 AtI. 74 (1929).
115 AtI. 262, 9 N. J. Misc. 620, Aff'd., 109 N.

(1931).
4

51 S. D. 477, 215 N. W. 533 (1927).

3.

Law 220, 160 AtI.
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We think that there is no commercial uncertainty in the notes in question, and approve the language of Judge Amidon when he said:
'The rule requiring certainty in commercial paper was a rule of
commerce before it was a rule of law. It requires commercial, not
mathematical, certainty. An uncertainty which does not impair the
functions of negotiable instruments in the judgment of business men
ought not to be regarded by the courts.' Cudahy Packing Co. v. State
National Bank, 134 F. 538, 67 C. C. A. 662, at 666."
The Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri held in Brown v.
Vossen 5 that an interest bearing note providing that if the interest
be not paid semi-annually, it should become as principal and bear
the same rate of interest, was negotiable. The court stated that there
was nothing indefinite, contingent, or uncertain about the terms of
this note, and that no proper objection could be made to it within
the law merchant. A similar note was before the Supreme Court of
Washington in the case of Barker v. Sartori.6 The note provided for
the payment of interest semi-annually at the rate of 9% from date
until paid, and if the interest was not so paid it was to bear interest
after delinquency until date at the rate of 9%. In holding the instrument to be negotiable the court compared it to a note payable
in instalments. The fact that an instalment might not be paid, and
thereafter the note would not show on its face the amount to be due
at maturity, does not affect the negotiability of such an instrument.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in Gilmore v. Hirst,7 held a note payable
with interest at the rate of 8% per annum until paid, interest due to
become principal and draw 8% interest, to be negotiable. The only
comment made by the court was that such a provision did not make
the amount uncertain.
In deciding which of these two views is the sounder, it should be
remembered that the entire law of negotiable instruments arose from
the needs of business men. From the standpoint of the business man
such a provision in an instrument would not render it less desirable.
No one would hesitate to purchase such an instrument merely because
of the presence of the provision. Ordinarily men carry out their contracts according to their terms. If such a contract is carried out there
could be no uncertainty as to the amount to be paid under it. It is
only upon default or breach of contract that the provision becomes
operative. In that case it would seem better to consider it merely as
a provision for liquidated damages caused by the breach of contract,
and not affecting the negotiability of the instrument. In an instrument
payable with current exchange, due to the fluctuations in the rate of
5

112 Mo. App. 676, 87 S. W. 577 (1905).

6
7

66 Wash. 260, 119 Pac. 611 (1911).
56 Kan. 626, 44 Pac. 603 (1S96).
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exchange, it is impossible to determine at any given date the exact
amount to be paid on the instrument at maturity. Yet such instruments
are negotiable. To hold that an instrument providing for the payment
of interest upon deferred interest is nonnegotiable, is to adhere to
the letter rather than to the spirit of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
John A. Berry.

BILLS AND NOTES-STATEMENTS

INCORPORATING

EXTRINSIC

IN-

STRUMENTs-EFFECT ON NEGOTIABILITY.-The necessity of certainty

and precision in mercantile affairs, and the inconvenience which
would result if commercial paper were encumbered with conditions
and contingencies, have led to the establishment of an inflexible rule,
that to be negotiable a contract must -be payable absolutely and without any conditions or contingencies to embarrass its circulation.1
The Negotiable Instrument Law provides that an instrument to be
negotiable "must contain an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain
in money." The reason of the rule, it was well said by Lord Kenyon,
is, "that it would perplex the commercial transactions of mankind if
paper securities of this kind were issued out into the world encumbered with conditions and contingencies, and if the parties to whom
they were offered in negotiation were obliged to inquire when the uncertain events would probably be reduced to a certainty." 2
The questions to be considered in this note are: (1) What statements in a note referring to extrinsic instruments will operate to incorporate the extrinsic instrument in the note?; and (2) Under what
conditions will incorporating extrinsic instruments in the note destroy
the negotiable character of the note?
The problem involved under our first question is illustrated by the
following cases: In Lockrow v. Cline s a bond which was otherwise
negotiable, in specific terms made a mortgage deed, which was given
to secure its payment, a part of that contract. The words of incorporation were as follows: "To which said deed reference is hereby made,
and which is made a part of this contract." It was held that each and
every condition, provision, and stipulation contained in the mortgage
deed thereby became a part of the bond to the same extent that it
would have been had the same been written in full upon the face of
said instrument; and where the mortgage deed contains any promise or
stipulation which, if inserted in the bond, would render it nonnegotiable, such will be the legal effect of that clause which makes the

I

"Bills and Notes," 3 R. C. L. 882, § 68.

2

Carlos v. Fancourt, 5 T. R. 482, 4 Eng. Rul. Cas. 180 (1794).

3

4

Kan.

App. 716, 46 Pac. 720 (1896).
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mortgage deed a part of the contract. Also in Chapman v. Steiner4
the note contained the following clause: "In case of the breach of any
of the covenants or conditions in the mortgage deed securing this bond
contained, to which said deed reference is hereby made, and which is
made a part of thi contract, in either such case the said principal sum
with all accrued interest, shall, at the election of the legal holder or
holders hereof, at once become due and payable without further notice
and may be demanded and collected, anything herein contained to the
contrary notwithstanding." It was held here that the mortgage was
incorporated into the note so as to destroy negotiability. The court
said: "You may not incorporate with such a promise stipulation and
agreements as to other matters, and then say that the absolute promise to pay money lifts the contract into the region of negotiable paper."
But in the case of Farmer v. Malvern First National Bank 5 the
following statement was held not to incorporate the mortgage in the
note: "This note is given for borrowed money and is secured by a
mortgage of this date." Also, in Page v. Ford8 incorporation was held
not to result from the provision: "This note is secured by mortgage
of even date given to secure the balance of the purchase price of the
property described in said mortgage."
In the recent Illinois case of Pflueger v. Broadway Trust and Savings Bank 7 a similar decision is reached. In this case the plaintiff
brings an action of replevin against the Broadway Trust and Savings
Bank for the recovery of three debenture bonds. The defendant entered a special plea alleging that the bonds were payable to bearer and
negotiable. On December 26, 1926, the defendant bank accepted the
three debentures as collateral security for a seven-day loan made to
one Hoffmeyer who gave his note for the amount of the loan which
was unpaid. The plaintiff, who was the owner of the debentures, placed
them in a safe from which they were stolen about April 9, 1928, by
some unknown persons. He maintains that they are nonnegotiable
4 5 Kan. App. 326, 48 Pac. 607 (1897). Accord: Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Southern States Phosphate & Fertilizer Co., 20 Ga. App. 506, 93 S. E. 157
(1917); Titlow v. Hubbard, 63 Ind. 6 (1878); McComas v. Haas, 107 Ind. 512,
8 N. E. 579 (1886); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Times Pub. Co., 143 La. 209,
76 So. 612 (1917); Cushing v. Field, 70 Me. 50, 35 Am. Rep. 293 (1879); Grimison
v. Russell, 14 Neb. 521, 45 Am. Rep. 126, 16 N. W. 819 (1883); Dakin v. Graves,
48 N. H. 45 (1868); Riech v. Daigle, 17 N. D. 365, 117 N. W. 346 (1908);
Reynolds v. Richards, 14 Pa. 205 (1850); Dilley v. Van Wie, 6 Wis. 206 (1858);
International Finance Corp. v. Calvert Drug Co., 124 AtI. 891 (Md. 1924).
5 89 Ark. 132, 115 S. W. 1141, 131 Am. St. Rep. 79 (1909).
6 65 Or. 450, 131 Pac. 1013, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1048, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)
247 (1913).
7 351 Ill. 170, 184 N. E. 318 (1932), aff'g. 265 Ill. App. 569. Accord: Bright
v. Offield, 81 Wash. 442, 143 Pac. 159 (1914); Utah Lake Irrigation Co. v. Allen,
64 Utah 511, 231 Pac. 818 (1924); Sturgis Nat. Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings
Bank, 351 Ill. 465, 184 N. E. 589 (1933), aff'g. 266 Ill. App. 199.
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because they were issued under a certain trust agreement. The statement in the debentures referring to said trust agreement was as follows: "To which trust agreement reference is hereby made for a statement of the terms under which the said debentures are issued and the
rights and obligations of the company, of the trustees and of the respective holders of the said debentures under the said trust agreement." Plaintiff claims that this clause so modifies the unconditional
promise to pay that it renders the debentures nonnegotiable. In order for the above clause to render the debentures nonnegotiable it
must be of such a nature that the unconditional promise to pay has
become qualified or uncertain; this must be determined from the
writing itself and not from extrinsic evidence. The quoted reference
to the trust agreement does not affect this unconditional promise to
pay, but only means that the holder is referred to the trust agreement for his rights under the agreement. The court decided the question on this theory and held the debentures were negotiable.
This distinction as to the unconditional promise to pay under
the trust agreement is clearly drawn by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Paepcke v. Paine.8 There the court said in commenting on a
reference which was practically the same as stated in the above-mentioned Illinois case: "The reference in the bond above quoted does
not assume to in any way affect the unconditional promise to pay.
A purchaser is referred to the trust agreement for a statement of the
rights and obligations of the company, the trustee and the holders of
the bonds 'under the said trust agreement.' It in no way refers to or
qualifies the unconditional promise of the company to pay the bond
at maturity theretofore clearly expressed. The reference gives notice
to the bondholder that he may examine the trust agreement to ascertain the nature and kind of security pledged to insure payment and
the procedure provided for to enforce the same, should he care to do
so before making purchase thereof. But it in no way imposes that
duty upon him in order to determine the status of the bond as a
negotiable instrument."
In Sturgis National Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank 9 the
statement on the note was: "This bond is one of a series of bonds
8 253 Mich. 636, 235 N. W. 871 (1931). Accord: Farmer v. Malvern First
Nat. Bank, op. ot. supra note 5; Dumas v. People's Bank, 146 Ala. 226, 40 So.
964 (1906); Aspen First Nat. Bank v. Mineral Farms Cons. Min. Co., 17 Col.
App. 452, 68 Pac. 981 (1902); Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. Naslund,
13 Pac. (2d) 775 (Cal. 1932); Duncan v. Louisville, 13 Bush 378, 26 Am. Rep.
201 (1877); Collins v. Bradbury, 64 Me. 37 (1875); Towne v. Rice, 122 Mass.
67 (1877); Howry v. Eppinger, 34 Mich. 29 (1876); Ewing v. Clark, 76 Mo. 545
(1882); Heard v. Dubuque County Bank, 8 Neb. 10, 30 Am. Rep. 811 (1878);
Valley Nat. Bank v. Crowell, 148 Pa. 284, 23 Atl. 1068, 33 Am. St. Rep. 824
(1892).
9 Op. ct. supra note 7.
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for the aggregate principal sum of two million five hundred thousand
dollars ($2,500,000) or five hundred and thirteen thousand seven hundred and sixteen pounds, four shillings and five pence... sterling, and
is entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of a mortgage
or deed of trust dated January 3, 1910, made by the obligor company to City Trust Company, as trustee. This bond is subject to redemption at 10% and accrued interest on January 1, 1915, and any
interest date thereafter. The obligor company is required to create a
sinking fund which is to be used in the purchase of bonds of said
series at or below said redemption price, and the principal of said
bonds may become due in case of default or sale under said mortgage
or deed of trust, all as provided in said mortgage or deed of trust, to
which reference is made for a complete statement." Upon giving his
decision that the bonds were negotiable, the court said: "There is no
statement in the bonds that the terms or provisions of the mortgage
are made or shall be considered a part of the bonds, and no reference
to any provisions of the mortgage or deed of trust except those which
have been mentioned. The only word in the bond which lends slight
color to the plaintiff in error's claim is the word 'subject.' It is manifest
that the only purpose of the recital in the bonds was to notify the purchaser that, besides the absolute personal obligation which was enforceable against the corporation, there was a specific mortgage lien on real
estate to which the purchaser might resort for information as to the
situation, extent and value of the security and for the means, right,
manner, and limitation of the enforcement of such security. The bond
specifically recites that it is entitled to the benefits of the mortgage
or deed of trust and subject to its provisions, which amounts to no
more than that it is entitled to the security of the mortgage or deed of
trust subject to its provisions for making the security available. This
is the fair and reasonable interpretation of the bonds in this case,
particularly in view of the rule stated by Professor Williston in his
work on Negotiable Instruments, on page 266: 'When the reference
presents a questionable problem of interpretation because of the
desirability of upholding. the negotiability of an instrument which the
commercial world treats as negotiable, the courts will incline to interpret the reference as one which does not qualify the corporation's
promise to pay but simply refers the holder to the indenture for the
determination of his rights with reference to the security.'"
As to the second question, under what conditions incorporating extrinsic instruments into the note will destroy its negotiable character,
the student is confronted with two propositions: (1) The negotiability
must be determined from the face of the note itself. Anything requiring reference to another document to determine the terms of the instrument destroys negotiability. (2) Negotiability of the note- will
not be destroyed merely by incorporating an extrinsic instrument in

NOTES
the note if nothing in the extrinsic instrument conflicts with the requisites of a negotiable contract.
One of the leading cases supporting the first proposition is Enoch v.
Brandon.10 In this case The Manitoba Power Company issued a series
of bonds all of which were equally secured by and entitled to the
benefits and subject to the provisions of a trust mortgage. The bonds
contained the following clause in referring to the mortgage: "To which
reference is hereby made for a description of the property mortgaged
and pledged, the nature and extent of the security, the rights of the
holders of the bonds with respect thereto, the manner in which notice
may be given to such holders, and the terms and conditions upon
which said bonds are issued and secured." The court said that such
a reference made the bonds nonnegotiable and set out the reason that
in order to be negotiable a bond or note must contain an unconditional
promise to pay a fixed sum on demand, or at a fixed or determinable
future time, to order or bearer. Only if it fulfills these requirements
is it negotiable. If in the bond or note anything appears requiring
reference to another document to determine whether in fact the unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum at a future date is modified
or subject to some contingency, then the promise is no longer unconditional. What that document may provide is immaterial.
In King Cattle Company v. Joseph 11 an action was brought to recover bonds issued by the plaintiff and held by the defendant. Plaintiff's president, R. S. Nutt, borrowed money from Slimmer and Thomas
and gave his note for $12,000, depositing 40 bonds and a certificate
for 750 shares of stock in the plaintiff company as collateral. Stevens
and Company indorsed the note and Nutt failing to pay, the former
paid it and took the note and collateral. Stevens and Company pledged
Nutt's notes to the Union State Bank of Minneapolis. Twenty of the
bonds were also pledged in this same bank. Stevens and Company
later pledged the remaining twenty to the defendant to secure a debt
of $11,200. The bonds contained a clause which read: "All of which
bonds have been issued, or are to be issued, under and in pursuance of,
and are all equally secured by, and are subject to an indenture of
mortgage or deed of trust, dated September fifteenth, 1920, duly
executed by the company to said Yellowstone Bank & Trust Company, of Sidney, Montana, as trustee, under which indenture all of
the property of the company, real, personal, and mixed, now owned
or hereafter acquired, has been transferred and mortgaged to said
trustee and hereby reference is made to said indenture and the same
made a part hereof, with the same effect as if herein fully set forth."
The language of these bonds goes far beyond a mere reference to the
10
11

249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 (1933).
158 Minn. 481, 198 N. W. 798, 199 N. W. 437 (1924).
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underlying security. The parties evidently intended to incorporate and
include the provisions of the trust deed in the bonds. They wrote into them a notice to an intending purchaser that, in determining the
nature of the obligation of the maker, he could not stop with a reading of the bonds, but must also read the trust deed, for the conditions
of the trust deed were impressed upon them. In one sense the bonds
were incomplete, not because there were unfilled blanks or omissions
to be supplied, for there were none, but because on their face the
bonds carried notice that the entire contract of the parties was not
expressed. It was necessary to look to a separate instrument to be
certain as to when and how the maker of the bonds could be compelled to pay them. For these reasons the bonds were held to be
nonnegotiable.
The note in Hull v. Angus 12 contained upon its face a condition
in these words: "This note is given as a part of the purchase price
of real property, and is secured by mortgage of even date herewith,
and is subject to all the terms and conditions of said mortgage." The
court laid down the rule that when the language of a bond not only
refers to the provisions of the trust deed securing it, but makes the
bond subordinate to the conditions of the deed, the bond shows upon
its face that it is not a complete and regular negotiable instrument. A
purchaser cannot determine from a mere inspection of the bond that
it contains an unconditional promise to pay a sum certain at a fixed
or determinable future time, but must examine the deed to ascertain
the precise nature of the obligation of the maker of the bond.
A leading case supporting the second proposition is Hunter v.
Clarke 13 in which case a note was involved providing as follows: "I
promise to pay to the order of Edward T. Oliver five thousand dollars, with interest on the same at the rate of eight per cent. per
annum, after due, until paid, according to the tenor of a certain mortgage deed bearing even date herewith, given by John B. Hunter and
wife to Edward T. Oliver. Payable at the State National Bank, with
exchange. John B. Hunter." Plaintiff also set out the mortgage mentioned in said principal note, which secured the same and the notes
given for interest up to its maturity. The mortgage provides that, in
case of the neglect or refusal to pay any of said notes when due, or
in case of waste or nonpayment of taxes and assessments, or neglect
to insure or keep insured the buildings on the mortgaged premises for
the benefit of the mortgagee, the principal note, with all accrued interest thereon, should become due and payable at the option of the
legal holder thereof, and the mortgage might then be foreclosed. The
objections made to this note are that, when read with the mortgage
12
13

60 Or. 95, 118 Pac. 284 (1911).
184 111. 158, 56 N. E. 297, 75 Am. St. Rep. 160 (1900).
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therein referred to, it may become payable before the time specified
in the note; and by virtue of the provisions of the mortgage it secures
an uncertain sum for taxes and insurance, and secures the holder
against acts constituting waste. Assuming that the note and mortgage
are to be construed as one instrument so far as the stipulations of
the mortgage may affect the note, the first question is whether a provision that upon a certain contingency the holder shall have the option to declare a note due before the time fixed for its maturity will
destroy its negotiability. It is true that the money must be certainly
payable, and, if it is uncertain whether the money will ever become
due, the instrument is not a promissory note. Here it is certain that
the time would arrive when the note would be payable. It would be
absolutely due on March 1, 1894, but upon a certain contingency it
might become due earlier. Notes payable at or before a given date are
negotiable. An option of the maker to pay before the date fixed does
not affect the negotiability of the note, and it is payable absolutely
notwithstanding the option. Consequently, the incorporation in the
promissory note of the mortgage not interfering with the requisites
of negotiability, the note must be held to be negotiable.
In Farmeret al. v. First Nat. Bank of Malvern 14 the note read: "I
promise to pay to Jesse M. Grubbs, or order, the sum of one thousand
dollars with ten per cent interest from date until paid for value received of him. This note is given for borrowed money and is secured
by a mortgage of this date on the following personal property, to wit:
(Describing it.) The appraisement of property is waived in the face
of said mortgage, and it includes any other indebtedness that may
be due from the maker of this note to the said Jesse M. Grubbs, and
the undersigned agrees to have said property insured in some good
insurance company in the sum of $1,000 to protect the holder of this
note. This first day of April, A. D. 1904. P. B. Farmer." Wood, J.,
stated that the note was a negotiable instrument, saying: "The general rule is that 'it is essential to the negotiability of a note that it
purport to be only for the payment of money; for, if any other agreement of a different character be ingrafted upon it, it becomes a special
contract clogged and involved with other matters, and loses thereby
its character as a commercial instrument.' But the general rule is subject to the qualification that, if the superadded agreement do not impair the certainty of the promise to pay the certain amount named
but only facilitates the means of its collection, it does not in any degree destroy the negotiability of the instrument, but is embodied in
14

Op. cit. supra note 5. See also: Des Moines Say. Bank. v. Arthur," 163

Iowa 205, 143 N. W. 556 (1913); Blumenthal v. Jassoy, 29 Minn. 177, 12 N. W.

517 (1882) ; Bradbury v. Kinney, 63 Neb. 754, 89 N. W. 257 (1902) ; Cunningham
v. McDonald, 98 Tex. 316, 83 S. W. 372 (1904); Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis.
149, 101 N. W. 417, 68 L. R. A. 146, 107 Am. St. Rep. 1003 (1904).
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the contract of all the parties, and passes as an incident of the paper
itself to every holder.' '.. . . The point to determine is ...whether such
agreement is a part of or necessary to the fulfillment of the promise or
order. If it is not, it does not destroy the instrument's negotiability.'
.... Here the recitals of the fact of the mortgage as a collateral to the

note and of the promise to have the property insured as an additional
security do not in any wise impair the obligation to pay the certain
amount in money named. It does not tend to impede, but rather to
facilitate, its collection. The promise to pay a certain sum of money
at a certain time remains absolute. The collateral contract does not
affect the principal obligation except to aid in its fulfillment. The
note therefore remains a courier without luggage."
Joseph P. Judge.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DUE PROCESS OF

LAW-MORATORIA ACTS.

-Home Building and Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell,' recently decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, shows a more marked tendency
toward a more liberal construction of the Constitution than any previously decided case. The case attracted much public attention since
it was the first important judicial test that the so-called "New Deal"
legislation was forced to undergo. Its fate might be regarded as a forerunner of the future of like legislative enactment which will depend
upon the exigency of the times as a reason for their affirmation.
Briefly, the case came to litigation under the moratorium statute
passed by the Minnesota legislature in 1933.2 That Act provides that
"the period of redemption may be extended for such additional time
as the court may deem just and equitable, but in no event beyond
May 1st, 1935." 3 The principal question envolved was as to the constitutionality of the above Statute under which the appellee mortgagor
claimed the statutory extension, and which the appellant mortgagee
claimed as a violation of the contract clause 4 and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution. The Minnesota court held the Statute constitutional 5
and this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
In 1811 the United States Supreme Court had its first real opportunity to decide whether the constitution was to be an air-tight doc1 54 S. Ct. 231 (1933), affirming Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n,
249 N. W. 893, 86 A. L. R. 1507 (Minn. 1933).
2 Chapter 339, Laws of Minnesota (1933).

3 Op. cit. supra note 2.
4 Art. 1, § 10.
5 Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n, op. cit.

supra,note

1.
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ument or a flexible guide to suit the exigencies of the times. Chief
Justice Marshall, in deciding Sturges v. Crowninskield,6 which held
invalid all discharges of debtors by insolvency and bankruptcy laws
passed subsequently to the making of the contracts affected thereby,
held to a strict adherence of the constitutional principles as laid
down by the makers of the constitution. The case is an oft repeated
one and has influenced almost every constitutionality test since it was
decided. In that case Marshall differentiates between a remedy and an
obligation in a contract. The present Court dismisses Marshall's distinction by merely saying that neither the reasoning nor the case
parallels the present case. Whether it does or does not is a question
we are not prepared to answer here. It does, however, show the ever
present tendency away from strict interpretations and precedent.
The question of moratorium statutes is by no means a new one.
No serious economic crisis ever passed without numerous attempts at
debtor relief. 7 Heretofore it had been an uninterrupted practice of
the Supreme Court, with but few exceptions, to overrule such attempts
as a violation of the contract clause of the Constitution. The questions
presented and the arguments given on both sides are not new in the
records of the Supreme Court. In all these statutes the relief provided for was for extension of redemption after sale, while in the
Minnesota case both the sale and the redemption are postponed.
Likewise in the Minnesota Statute there was a provision for the payment of rents which the court emphasizes, while in all the other statutes no such provision was made. In 1841 a statute in Illinois provided that redemption on mortgages be postponed. 8 The case of Brown
v. Kinzie 9 was litigated under this statute and the United States Supreme Court held the law to be unconstitutional. Brown v. Kinzie
has been the leading case 10 on the subject for years and its holding
is apparently in direct conflict with the decision in the case under consideration. However, the Court, in Brown v. Kinzie, does not consider any emergency nor does there appear to have been one at that
time. The court in this case holds to the strictest interpretation of
4 Wheat. 118; 4 Law. Ed. 529 (1819).
See "Mortgages," 41 C. J. 863.
8 Act of the legislature of Illinois, approved February 27, 1841.
9 1 How. 310, 11 Law. Ed. 143 (1843).
10 M'Crackin v. Hayward, 11 Law. Ed. 399, 2 How. 606 (1844); Hathorn
v. Calef, 17 Law Ed. 779, 69 U. S. 10 (1864); U. S. v. Muscatine, 19 Law. Ed.
494, 75 U. S. 575 (1869) ; Tennessee v. Sneed, 24 Law. Ed. 612, 96 U.S. 69 (1877) ;
Hoyt Metal Co. v. Atwood, 289 Fed. 455 (1923); M'Clintick-Marshall Co. v.
Scandinavian American Bld'g Co., 296 Fed. 604 (1924); Smith v. Spillman, 205
S. W. 107, 1 A. L. R. 136 (Ark. 1918); Notes: 1 A. L. R. 143; 9 A. L. R. 9.
In Tennessee v. Sneed, 24 Law. Ed. 612, 96 U. S. 69 (1877), the court modified
somewhat the rule but still followed Brown v. Kinzie. The court said a state
6
7

legislature could alter or modify a remedy to enforce a contract without impairing
its obligation, provided an effectual remedy is left for its enforcement.
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the constitution and from the language used in the decision it is reasonable to infer that had the Supreme Court decided Home Bld'g &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell in 1841, it would have decided it in an entirely
different manner. This alone should be enough to show the change in
constitutional constructions.
If any general rule can be formulated it is that a mere change in
remedy does not violate Art. 1, Section 10, of the Constitution, unless
it amounts to an impairment of the obligation of contract. In all
cases resembling the one under discussion it has been variously argued
as to what amounts to a mere remedy and what is an impairment of
the obligation. No set rule has ever been laid down as the question is
generally one peculiar to the case under discussion. However, there
are cases holding that war legislation in the nature of a dilatory law
which suspends any creditor's right, when that right is based upon a
contract, is unconstitutional. 1
The above cases are absolute and no deviation from this rule has
ever been recorded until 1920, when the New York and Washington
lease cases were decided. 1" These cases appear to be in direct parallel
with the present case. At the time these cases were decided there was
a shortage of housing both in New York City and in the city of
Washington following the World War due to a sudden influx of immigrants. The fact that aproperty owner is deprived of occupation and
re-leasing, perhaps at even better rents, after a lease has run its contracted course, is certainly an impairment of a contractual obligation.
Yet these cases were held not to violate the impairment clause in the
Constitution purely on the grounds that there was an emergency which
had to be met by emergency measures. 13 In People v. La Fetra,14 the
leading New York lease case, the court sounded the opening note of
the present tendency when it was said: "Although an emergency canhot become a source of power and though the constitution cannot be
suspended in any complication of war or peace, an emergency may
afford a reason for putting forth a latent governmental power already
11 Note, 9 A. L. R. 9; Hudspeth v. Davis, 41 Ala. 389 (1866); Burt v.
Williams, 24 Ark. 91 (1863); Stevens v. Andrews, 31 Mo. 205 (1860); Jones v.
Crittenden, 4 N. C. 385 (1814).
12 Horn v. Klugman, 112 Misc. 171, 183 N. Y. S. 150 (1920); Shanik v.
Eckhardt, 112 Misc. 86, 183 N. Y. S. 155 (1920); Guttag v. Shatzkin, 113 Misc.
362, 185 N. Y. S. 71 (1920); William Brandt & Co. v. Wel, 113 Misc. 320, 185
N. Y. S. 497 (1920).
13 Paterno Investment Co. v. Katz, 112 Misc. 282, 184 N. Y. 737 (1920):
"If in fact an emergency exists and conditions have arisen 'which seriously affected
the public welfare, health and morals in the city of New York' it was not only
the right but the duty of the legislature to pass statutes which would reasonably
tend to correct the conditions and remove the danger to the public welfare, health
and morals." See also Blek v. Davis, 193 App. Div. 215, 183 N. Y. S. 737 (1920).
14 130 N. E. 601, 16 A. L. R. 152 (N. Y. 1921).
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enjoyed but previously unexercised." The statement in itself is not
new since it has been propounded before, notably in Ex Parte Milligan, 15 which is often cited as holding just what the New York court
decided in the La Fetra case. However, the startling fact remains that
both the New York and the Washington lease cases mark the first
holding that carried the above generalization into decisions where
finding the so-called "latent governmental power" was a difficult thing
to do.
Block v. Hirsk,16 the leading Washington lease case, marks the initial step of the Supreme Court of the United States into the realm of
uncertainty as to constitutional interpretation. It likewise shows the
leaning away from precedent which would not allow such flexibility
in interpreting the Constitution. Chief Justice Holmes said, 'n this
case: "Circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space
as to clothe with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by
law an interest which at other times, or in other places, would be a
matter of private concern." Whether such a blanket statement in favor
of flexibility would have seemed heresy to Marshall,-a matter of conjecture,-we are not prepared to answer. In the light of Sturges v.
Crowninsneld 17 it would not seem that Marshall could have assented
to such a novel view. The fact that it shows a marked and surprising
reversal of form is sufficient.
The next case notable in the history of this question is the Blaisdell
case now under consideration. The Supreme Court of Minnesota perhaps more openly gave the real reason for the decision than did the
Supreme Court of the United States. The Minnesota Court held the
statute constitutional and said: "The only ground upon which chapter 339, Laws of 1933, can be sustained is that it is legislation in virtue
of the police power called into existence because of the public economic emergency which the act declares exists in this state." Is This
plain statement is exactly the ground upon which the Minnesota Court
decided the case, which was only recently upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The United States Supreme Court, though
interspersing their opinion with other considerations, finally evolved
the rule which, in the final analysis, is the same as laid down by the
Minnesota Court quoted above. Chief Justice Hughes, in his opinion,
goes into the history of the making of the constitution and of the
forces which prompted the insertion of the "contract clause" of Art.
1, Sec. 10.19 The times immediately following the Revolution were
frought with much financial distress. There were many attempts at
Is 18 Law. Ed. 28 (1861).

16

256 U. S. 196 (1921).

17
18

4 Wheat. 118, 4 Law. Ed. 529 (1819).
Blaisdell v. Home Building & Loan Ass'n., op. cit. supra note 1.
Citing Fiske, The Critical Period of American History (8th Ed.) 168 et seq.

10

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

legislation to defeat the claims of creditors and the ends of justice.
So numerous were these attempts that contractual relations were virtually at a standstill and the constitution fathers, seeing the need for
some sort of check on legislative power along this line, inserted the
article on impairment. Whether this was meant to be merely a check
to help inspire confidence and trust in business, or whether it was an
absolute provision which was to be construed strictly and without variation, is a question which has been answered with many and conflicting opinions. Marshall ascribed to the latter view, while our present
Court tends in the opposite direction.
The decision no doubt will be far reaching in its results. Already
numerous states have enacted similar statutes 20 and some have been
declared unconstitutional by the state courts. Other measures of debtor
relief and similar legislation will receive heretofore unheard of con21
sideration in the light of the recent view on emergency construction.
What results the decision will have upon other questions of constitutionality that will come up in the future cannot now be answered.
Will the Court carry its newly elucidated interpretation to new heights,
or will it, after the present emergency lapses, renew the old construction of Marshall? How far will the court go in declaring even emergency legislation constitutional? These questions only time can answer.
The Constitution has been the guiding light in 150 successful years
of model constitutional government. It has been the supreme law ever
ready to check over-zealous legislators and a strict adherence to it has
kept the principles of democracy intact. Our tendency of late has been
to enlarge the meaning of its makers and to give broader interpretations to its prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Minnesota declared
their statute to be "not a violation but a vindication of our form of
constitutional government." Chief Justice Hughes further substantiates
this statement when he says: "The settlement and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure of a constantly increasing
density of population, the interrelation of the activities of our people
and the complexity of our economic interests, have inevitably led to
an increased use of the organization of society in order to protect the
very basis of individual opportunity."
Paul Kempter.

20

Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,

Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North

Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
People v. Nebbia, 186 N. E. 183 (N. Y. 1933); Russel v. Battle Creek
21
Lumber Co., 252 N. W. 561 (Mich. 1934).
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CONVERSION-WHAT

CONSTITUTES POSSESSION-RELATIVE

RIGHTS

OF PROPERTY OWNERS.-The Appellate Court of Indiana has just hand-

ed down a decision which, with respect, the writer believes is not sus-

tainable by principle or authority. The case is titled Chicago, I. & L.
Ry. Co. v. Pope.1 Because of a wreck an amount of coal was thrown
upon the defendant's land. The plaintiff requested the defendant's permission to remove the coal, but this the defendant refused until the
plaintiff should pay the sum of thirty-five dollars. An agent of the
plaintiff began to remove the coal, but after part of it had been removed the defendant forbade him to take any more. The plaintiff
thereupon sued in conversion. The lower court held for the defendant
and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision.
Let us first examine the reasoning whereby the learned judge arrived at his decision. He based his decision upon a North Carolina
case.2 In this case the plaintiff had purchased a quantity of lightwood
at a sheriff's sale of the defendant's property. Upon the plaintiff's attempt to obtain the wood he was refused admission to the defendant's
land, and informed that directly he made an attempt to enter for that
purpose the defendant would sue him. The plaintiff sued for conversion. The question of whether or not the defendant had exercised such
dominion over the wood as to constitute conversion was deemed one
for the jury.

However, the learned judge, with fitting wisdom, chose to base his
present decision not on the holding but on the dissenting opinions of
two equally learned Carolina judges. The first of these held that conversion is an act, and that where no act has been done there is no
conversion. Further, that the defendant's threat to sue the plaintiff was
without legal foundation and that, therefore, in fearing it the plaintiff
was "stupid." He then asks, "What has the Plaintiff to complain of?
Has the Defendant injured his property? Has he used it in any way, or
exercised any act of ownership inconsistent with the Plaintiff's right?
He has not. He has merely threatened to sue the Plaintiff if he took
the lightwood away, or entered upon his premises for that purpose
and it is admitted that no such action would lie."
The second judge's dissenting opinion agrees essentially with that
of his confrere. He says further, however, that the plaintiff had a right
to remove the wood, that this right was not impaired by the defendant's threat to sue, and that ". . . his physical power to do himself
justice still remained. Had that been opposed, then there would have
been a conversion ... The threats.., ought to have been disregarded
by the plaintiff."
I have been at pains to quote these two dissenting opinions in the
Carolina case because the learned judge here placed so much weight
1 188 N. E. 594 (Ind. 1934).
2

Nichols v. Newsom, 6 N. C. 302 (1813).
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on them. "The reasoning of said dissenting opinions," he said, "is so
peculiarly applicable to the instant case, and so convincing, that we
think we can best express our views on the question . . . by applying
said reasoning to the facts in this case." However, he made two exceptions to their case. Learning from experience he excluded all chance
of becoming a dissenter by ruling that the question of whether or not
this was conversion was not for the jury, but for the court to decide, as
being one of law, rather than of fact. He also ruled that in the Indiana
case "there would be no basis for such implied right of seizure." And,
repeating the rhetorical questions of the Carolina judge, he added
some of his own: "Are we forced to say that appellee had done anything which, in legal effect, amounts to more than an exercise of his
right to keep appellant off his premises? Is the mere exercise of such
right a wrongful invasion of appellant's right? The answers to all
these questions lead to the conclusion that appellee had done nothing
which was wrongful." And, in conclusion: "The evidence in the instant case does not conclusively show that there was a 'wrongful invasion of appellant's right to, and dominion over,' the coal."
So much for the reasoning. Now let us interpret the ruling. Upon
the facts of this case a landowner has an absolute right to his property,
subject, apparently, to no privileges. A "right to keep appellant off
premises" would seem to extend to all circumstances; and as long as
one does not injure another's property by anything he does on his
own property, or by anything that escapes from his property, he has
an absolute right to the possession and enjoyment of it according to
this decision. And whatever arrives on his land may not be removed.
Not by an action for conversion, as we have seen by this case. Not
by replevin, for according to Indiana statute 3 and decisions 4 the defendant must have possession of the plaintiff's goods before this action is maintainable and under the learned judge's ruling in the principal case the defendant has no such possession. Not by entry and removal of the goods, for the land owner, under the general rule, 5 may
repel the trespasser from breaking the close-unless the entry be
privileged. And the instant case has held that the plaintiff has no
privilege here.
The effect of such a rule should be an interesting development to
watch. For example: Without negligence on the owner's part, his car
gets out of control, enters the land of another and there suffers a
breakdown. The land owner may eject the trespasser 6 but under the
3

Burns Ann. Ind. Stats. (1926) § 1314.

4

Loutham v. Fitzer, 78 Ind. 449 (1881); West v. Goff, 55 N. E. 506 (Ind.

1899).
5 Newcone v. Russell, 133 Ky. 29, 117 S. W. 305 (1808); Morgan v. Durfee,
69 Mo. 469 (1879).
6 See cases in note 5, supra.
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ruling in point, the proprietor of the car may not recover the car as
long as the landowner does not injure the car or use it in any way.
To extend the example - if the car contained poultry, the owner could
not return to care for them. Or if, without negligence, cattle being
driven along the highway escape control and enter another's property, the farmer may not feed or milk lis beasts. If the aforementioned
car were a hearse, containing a corpse, "Let the dead bury their dead"
would no doubt be considered applicable. Unless the learned judge has
found a method of restraining human impulses, will men stand by and
endure such deprivation of property? Obviously not.
With all due reluctance then we must conclude that there is error
in the court's reasoning. Let us analyze it. The learned judge has held
that unless an act be done, unless the defendant make some positive
assertion of control, he has attained no possession; and secondly, that
the entry of the plaintiff to remove his property is not privileged and
therefore may be prevented.
First to consider the question of possession. The plaintiff obviously
does not haye possession of the property. It is here ruled that the defendant does not have possession of it. Would the learned judge have
us believe that possession of material objects can hang suspended in
air - halfway between heaven and earth, perhaps, like Mahomet's
coffin? This cannot be anything but the merest casuistry. Wherein lies
the difference as to whether I use a man's goods or keep him from
using them? Is it any more deleterious if I use them--"in a manner
inconsistent with his ownership"-- or keep him from. attending to
their care, so that he may have the delicious pleasure of seeing them
rot or die before his eyes? This last being, no doubt, in the court's
opinion, one of the possible shortcomings of ownership with which it
is entirely consistent.
Secondly, as to the privilege of entry. To hold that there is no such
privilege is to grant a landowner an absolute right to his land. In
Indiana, and elsewhere, a landowner's enjoyment of his property is
relative, not absolute, and sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas is a
phrase noted for more than its antiquity. A landowner may not conduct a business, however lawful, that will "interfere with the confortable enjoyment of life or property of adjoining owners." 7 Nor
may he construct a nuisance thereon,8 or allow a dangerous condition
to prevail where a reasonable man would say that the probability
of danger to others was strong.9 Furthermore, though a landowner has
a right to eject a trespasser he may not use unnecessary force 10 in so
doing. Nor may he use a dangerous instrument to repel possible tres7 Ft. Wayne Cooperage Co. v. Page, 170 Ind. 585, 82 N. E. 83 (1907).
8 Wolf v. DesMoines Elevator Co., 126 Iowa 659, 98 N. W. 301 (1904).
9 Young v. Harvey, 16 Ind. 314 (1861).
10 Wabash Ry. Co. v. Savage, 110 Ind. 314, 9 N. E. 85 (1886).
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passers."I It has even been held that a landowner has a duty of care to
an invitee who has become ill upon his property, and may not expel the
latter when he is apparently in a helpless condition.' 2 An Indiana
case 18 has held that one may not kill a dog who is trespassing on his
property under the presumption that the beast will create damages,
even though such presumption is based on past material damage done
by the same dog. In the light of this ruling one might ask with pertinence whether there is a substantial difference in effect between destroying property and allowing it to be destroyed by nature?
From these rulings it is obvious that a landowner's right in his
land is far from absolute. Now as to the question of privileged entry.
This question was raised in the two famous cases of Ploof v. Putman 14
and Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans. Co.' 5 In the former case the plaintiff
moored his boat to the defendant's dock during a terrific storm which
was imperilling his own life and those of his wife, children and servants. Because of the bumping of the boat the wharf was being damaged and the defendant cast loose the mooring ropes. The boat was
violently grounded and all aboard injured; whereupon the plaintiff
sued for damages. The court held that an entry upon another's land
is privileged in order to save one's own life or property, subject to
liability for any actual damage he may cause in so doing. In the Vincent case the defendant owned the ship. The plaintiff sued for damages caused by the defendant's failure to cast loose from the plaintiff's dock during a storm which threw the boat continually against
the dock. Here again it was held that although one is liable for actual
damages caused, he is privileged to trespass upon another's property
to save his own life or property.
Now as to the rule in Indiana. It was held in Conwell v. Emrie 16
that one is privileged to tear down another's building "to save it from
being consumed and consuming other buildings iadjoining." This is substantially the ruling of 21 Henry VII 27, and it was upon this that
the decision in Ploof v. Putman was largely based. It is difficult to
make any distinction between allowing one the privilege of entry to
save goods which are in danger of destruction by fire and allowing one
the same privilege to save goods from destruction by deterioration.
Therefore we suggest that the case of Chicago, I. & L. Ry. C. v.
Pope be reconsidered both in the light of the ruling of the Ploof and
Vincent cases, and in the interest of persons using adjoining property or highways.
Bird v. Holbrook, 4- Bing. 628, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (1828).
Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1 (1907).
I3 Sosat v. The State, 2 Ind. App. 586, 28 N. E. 1017 (1891).
1

12

81 Vt. 471, 71 At. 188 (1908).
109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (1910).
16 2 Ind. 35 (1850).
14

15
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The learned judge omitted all discussion of the ability of the defendant to set a sum in damages before allowing the plaintiff entry.
There seems to have been no evidence as to whether or not thirtyfive dollars was a reasonable figure for the damages that might have
been caused by removal of the coal. If no such evidence were offered
it would seem to us to be laxity on the part of the plaintiff. In any
case the defendant should not be granted a right to estimate his damages before they occur; the evils of such a situation may easily be foreseen, in view of the pecuniary spirit of the times. Nor should there be
any necessity for an arbitration before removal of the property; for
while the arbiters haggled the goods might very well become valueless-particularly if they are perishable.
In conclusion, with all due deference to the learned judge, we
proffer this as a ruling in those cases where personal property arrives
on land without negligence of the property owner: that the property
owner shall be privileged to enter immediately and remove his property subject to liability for whatever actual damages he may cause
by such removal.
Joseph A. McCabe.

GRAND JURIES-NUMBER SUMMONED-METHOD OF IMPANELLING.-

With the handing down of the decision in the case of People of the
State of Illinois v. Jack Lieber, otherwise called Charles Liberi the
Supreme Court of Illinois cast an ominous doubt over the validity of
the method of selecting grand jurors which has been followed in Cook
County, home of the City of Chicago, since the passage of the Jury
Commissioners Act Amendment in 1897,2 as amended by act approved
July 2, 1931.3
The case upon which these momentous questions hinge was the
case of Jack Lieber, who was convicted of robbery with a gun and is
serving a sentence of one year to life in the penitentiary. Lieber's appeal was based on the ground that the sheriff had summoned sixty
persons for grand jury duty on the body which indicted him (the regular practice in Cook County) rather than twenty-three, the number
of jurors which, he says, the statute provides should be called. The
court, in an opinion by Chief justice Orr, supported -his contention.
Dissenting opinions were entered by Justices Clyde E. Stone and
Frederic R. DeYoung. A rehearing is to be granted.
1 Complete text of majority opinion is found in Chicago Daily News, Feb.
24, 1934.
2 4 J. & A. Ill. Stat. Ann. (1913) § 6856 et seq.
3 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931) C. 78, § 24 et seq.
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Though exact statistics as to the effect of the decision, if it is

made final on the rehearing which is to take place shortly, are of
course not yet available, newspaper surveys conducted amongst the
judges and bar of Cook County point out very serious possible consequences.
The newspapers report that there are approximately 700 indictments in Cook County awaiting trial, 4 and in these cases the counsel
for the defense will surely interpose the properly specific objections,
based on the Lieber case, to the validity of the indictment. It is, of
course, impossible to prophesy the rulings of the courts on these mothe protions, especially since there appears to be some conflict as to
5
priety of the motion when entered after indictment found.
The better view appears to be that these 700 odd defendants will
have to be re-indicted before they can properly be tried, and the resultant confusion and delay in an already over-crowded system are too
plain to need further comment.
The decision will not affect those cases where the defendant did
not properly take advantage of the alleged defect in summoning jurors
before verdict, as the cases unanimously hold that the objection comes
too late after verdict found. 6 In many cases in the past few years,
however, it is known the proper objections were made at the proper
time. Jurists and counsel set the number of convictions which depend
for their validity upon the express point raised in the Lieber case
at at least twenty-five. The more famous cases include these7 defendants: Ernest J. Stevens, Roger Touhy, and Dr. Wynekoop.
In the Lieber case, to quote the majority opinion:8 "The sole issue is whether the trial judge erred in refusing to quash the indictment
because, as alleged, the grand jury was illegally impanelled."
The method followed in summoning and impanelling the grand jury
in question is fully set out in the opinion. The judge ordered the clerk
to repair to the office of the jury commissioners and draw sixty names
of persons to appear as grand jurors for the July term, 1933. These
names were so drawn and summoned by the sheriff, he on his return
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1934; Chicago Daily News, Feb. 24, 1934.
5 See Stone v. People, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 326 (1840), wherein the court says, at
p. 334: "After indictment found, no objection of irregularity of impanelling a
grand jury can be received as a plea to the indictment." But in the Lieber case,
op. cit. supra note 1, Lieber, after arraignment and plea of not guilty, was allowed
on his motion to withdraw the plea with leave to file a written motion to quash
the alleged indictment. See, also: Hagenow v. People, 188 Ill. 545, 59 N. E. 242
(1900); Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 33 N. E. 757 (1893); Williams v. People,
54 Ill. 422 (1870). These cases and the Lieber case hold the error can be taken
after indictment found, if before the plea to the indictment.
6 See cases cited in note 5, supra.
7 Chicago Tribune, Feb. 25, 1934.
s Op. cit. supra note 1.
4
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showing three not found and one dead, and service bad on fifty-six.
Twenty-five of the fifty-six jurors summoned were excused before the
beginning of the term. During the interrogation of the thirty-one remaining grand jurors present, six more were excused by the chief justice, leaving twenty-five. The judge then said, is shown on the record
quoted by the majority opinion: "Now I have to take one of these
four men that asked to be excused. I have to have twenty-four ....
the reason I must do this is that I have to choose twenty-three and
I don't want to select them myself. I want them to be chosen at random and that is why I must have at least twenty-four." The clerk
then put twenty-four names in a hat, pulled out twenty-three, and
they thereupon sat as the grand jury.
The objections, in the majority opinions, to the method followed
may be divided into three main sections: First, they objected to the
number of grand jurors summoned, claiming that the statute requires
only twenty-three be summoned, and hence the summoning of sixty was
illegal. Second, the manner of their selection for service was illegal,
in that the judge exercised powers of selection which he did not possess. Third, the irregularities in summoning and selection resulted in
actual and substantial injustice to the defendant Lieber.
These objections of the Supreme Court will be considered in that
order, with an aim to present a partial picture of the difficult questions facing the court on rehearing.
As to the number to be summoned, it will be well to first consult
the Illinois statutes, which, it may be observed, are far from clear on
this point. To aid in understanding the statutes, a brief outline of their
history is essential. The Act of 1874 9 provides in section 1 for the
selection of jury lists by the county board "of each county." Nothing
here indicates any intention to make special provision for the larger
counties, such as Cook.
Section 2 relates to petit jurors (not grand jurors) when it provides for selection of 100 persons from the jury list for each trial
term, "to serve as petit jurors." Then follows the first distinction made
as to the size of counties concerned. In counties of less than 250,000
the board itself selects this distinct list of 100 from the larger jury
list. In counties of over 250,000 population "the persons to serve as
petit jurors shall be selected by the jury commissioners, as provided by
law." This distinction, it is to be noted again, applies only to the culling of names for petit jury service. Section 8 provides for the method
of drawing petit jurors.
Section 9 regulates the drawing of the grand jury. "If a grand jury
shall be required... it shall be the duty of the county board in each
9 J. & A. IM.Stat. Ann. (1913) p. 3741; Rev. Stat. (1874) p. 60.
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of the counties in this State... at least twenty days before the sitting
of such court, to select twenty-three persons . . . to serve as grand
jurors at such term; and to cause their clerk . . . to certify the names
of . . . the grand jurors to the clerk of the court . . .who shall issue
and delive? to the sheriff ... a summons commanding him to summon
the persons so selected."
Thus it is seen that the 1874 Statute leaves the entire matter of
selecting the grand jury, from the first selection of a general jury
list down to the order of their own clerk to the sheriff as to just what
men shall be summoned, up to the county boards, "of each of the
counties." No mention is made of jury commissioners for counties
over 250,000 population at any time. This statute is still on the
books. 10 It is in this statute of 1874 that the expression is found
which is thus interpreted by Chief Justice Orr: "Section 9 of the
Juror's Act (Cahill's 1931 Stat. Ch. 78, p. 1752) provides that whenever a grand jury 'shall be required by law or by the order of the
judge' the county board shall 'select twenty-three persons . . . to
serve as grand jurors at such terms.' " From this the Chief Justice
concludes: "It is apparent that . . . only twenty-three persons shall
they are to be selected . .. by the county board."
be selected -and
(Italics mine.)
This, then, would seem to be a holding that the Act of 1874, providing for sole authority of selecting in the county board, is still the
controlling law.
We come to a realization of the seriousness of the inference of this
interpretation when we realize that following the sections of the statute
thus far construed is found the Jury Commissioners Act. This act was
passed in 1887, thirteen years after the foregoing statute, and was
amended throughout by the Jury Commissioners Act of 1897.11 The
act applies only to counties of over 250,000 population - Cook County. The act provides for selection by the judges of three jury co=missioners. Section 2 of the act orders these commissioners to "prepare a list of all electors between the ages of twenty-one and sixty
years, possessing the necessary legal qualifications for jury duty, to
be known as the jury list." 12 Section 1 of the Act of 1874 (quoted
supra) gives power of selecting the jury list to the county board. This
later act purports to take the power out of their hands in all cases,
in counties of over 250,000 population, and vest the power in the jury
10 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933) C. 78, § 9, p. 1745. Minor amendments
have been made, including the one in effect Jan. 1, 1934, which, without changing
the power of the county boards to select, does make a specific reference to "the
circuit courts and the criminal court of Cook County" as to the time a grand jury
so summoned shall sit.
11 J. & A. Ill. Stat. Ann. (1913) p. 3758.
12 J. & A. Ill. Stat. Ann. (1913) p. 6857.
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commissioners. There is a clear field which it would seem cannot be
occupied by the two bodies.
Not only is the general jury list to be drawn up by the commissioners, but they are also given power in regards to selecting of names
for grand and petit jurors.' 3 At the time the Lieber jury was called,
in July, 1933, the statute in force read as follows:
"Drawing of Grand and Petit Jurors:
"One or more of the judges of each court of record .

.

. shall cer-

tify to the clerk of the court the number of petit jurors required each
month. The clerk shall then repair to the office of the jury commissioners and there,

. ..

proceed to draw by the lot the necessary num-

ber of names from those made available for such drawing as in section
8 of this act provided. 14 The clerk shall thereupon certify to the sheriff
the electors whose names are so drawn, to be summoned according to
law. If more jurors are needed during.the month, a judge of the court
shall so certify, and they shall be drawn and certified forthwith in the
manner above provided. Whenever a grand jury is required by law or
by an order of the court, it shall be drawn and certified in like manner." 15 (Italics mine.)

In regards to the section just quoted the majority opinion in the
Lieber case says: "This section relates only to the manner of drawing
and certifying the grand jury and makes no reference to the number
of grand jurors to be drawn and certified."
Therefore it is respectfully submitted that since it "makes no reference to the number of grand jurors to be drawn and certified" it
does not restrict the number to be drawn and certified to twentythree. The restriction in drawing to twenty-three was made in the Act
of 1874. The Jury Commissioners Act, as amended in 1931, would
seem to repeal by implication the Act of 1874, as it clearly contradicts
the earlier act as to who shall select and how this selection shall be
made, in counties of over 250,000 population. As far as Cook County is
concerned, the acts are mutually exclusive throughout, and it is believed the later act in time repeals by implication, for Cook County,
all provisions of the Act of 1874 relating to the selection and summon13 The Jurors Act of 1874, it will be recalled, left selection of grand juries
entirely up to the county boards.
14

Section 8 empowers jury commissioners to select active jury lists.

15 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933) C. 78, § 32, being § 9 of the Jury
Commissioners Act. All of section 9 was added by an "Act Approved July 2,
1931." (Laws, 1931, p. 655.) Prior to 1931 there was no provision in the Jury
Commissioners Act in regards to the drawing of grand and petit jurors, except the
provisions in sections 4 and 5 providing for selection and placing of names in a
"jury" and in a "grand jury" box. Sections 4 and 5 were expressly repealed by
Laws, 1931, p. 655.
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ing of grand jurors, including the restriction upon the number to be
drawn to twenty-three. 16
Immediately following the last quotation follows this further observation of the court: "As above noted, section 16 of the Jurors
Act provides that a panel of a grand jury must contain twenty-three
persons. That requirement is not changed by any provision of the
Jury Commissioners Act."
Again it is submitted that the fact that a panel of a grand jury
must contain twenty-three persons does not forbid the summoning of,
more than twenty-three from which the panel may be filled. So long
as only twenty-three are impanelled, the statute in question would
seem to be satisfied, irrespective of how many were summoned. The
number returned has always been recognized as different from the
number impanelled. As was said in Stone v. Tte People,' 7 in referring to the common law methods in England: "A precept was directed to the sheriff ... upon which he returned twenty-four or more
persons . . . from whom the grand jurors were selected, who were

qualified as jurors."
All that can be said with finality of section 16 is that it limits the
number of grand jurors that may be impanelled to twenty-three. In
modern times, this has been the usual rule, as it was the rule in
earlier times in England. However, at common law the practice of
summoning more than twenty-three existed side by side with the rule
in question. Therefore, it is submitted, the fact that twenty-three are
to be impanelled does not imply that but twenty-three should be summoned. The limitation to twenty-three on the jury has always prevailed, for the reason that "The bill also must be found by a majority
of jurors, and that majority must consist of twelve at least: 2 Hale
161; for which reason it is, that the number of persons on a grand
jury cannot exceed twenty-three nor be less than twelve." 18
Coexistent with the limitation of the number actually on the grand
jury to twenty-three, the common law allowed more than twenty-three
to be summoned. In 1 Ckitty, Criminal Law, 310, 311, it is said:
"Upon the summons of any sessions of the peace, and in case of com16 All prior laws that are conflicting, or parts of laws that are conflicting, are
repealed by later law by implication, without need of express repealing clause.
Hayne v. Danisch, 264 Ill. 467, 106 N. E.' 341 (1914); People v. City of Rock
237,
Island, 271 Ill. 412, 111 N. E. 291 (1915); Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill.
87 N. E. 1073 (1909). Where a new statute covers the subject completely, and

embraces new provisions, it repeals all former statutes on the subject, though
former statutes are not in all respects repugnant to later statutes. City of Buffalo
v. Lewis, 192 N. Y. 193, 84 N. E. 809 (1908); Brigham v. City of New York,
227 N. Y. 575, 124 N. E. 209 (1919).
17
2 Scam. (Il1.) 326 (1840).
1s

Archbold, Crim. P1. and Ev. (3rd. Am. Ed. 1835), at p. 66.
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missions of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery, there issues a precept, either in the name of the king or of two or more justices, directed
to the sheriff, upon which he is to return twenty-four or more out of
the whole county, namely, a sufficient number out of every hundred,
from which the grand jury is selected. Upon this precept, although it
generally specifies only 24, the sheriff usually returns 48 . . . Though
the number of jurymen thus returned to the court amount to 48 or
more, not more than 23 are to be sworn ..."
There is a Federal statute similar to section 16 of the Illinois act.
Yet the Federal courts uniformly hold that that does not restrict
the number that may be summoned to twenty-three, but rather that
the common law powers of the judges have been retained, and they
may summon more than twenty-three. "The conclusion reached is
that Congress intended to leave the number of persons that should be
summoned for grand jury service, as at common law, to the discretion
of the trial judges . . .In order to find in section 808 [providing for
impanelling of twenty-three] an implied intent to limit the number to
be summoned to 23, we must unnecessarily so construe the statute as
to create public inconvenience, and must, in defiance of an elementary
canon of construction, assume an intent to change the common law
which is not expressed and is neither necessarily nor clearly implied.
The chief argument for an implied intent to restrict the number that
may be summoned is found in the fact that the statute restricts the
maximum number that may be impanelled. At common law only 23
persons could act as grand jurors, but this fact did not forbid summoning more than 23 persons. By parity of reason the statute, in forbidding that more than 23 persons be impanelled as grand jurors, does
not impliedily forbid that more be summoned." 19
It-is believed that a practice which is followed in so many other
jurisdictions, which often obviates great public inconvenience, which
is fortified by sound rules of statutory construction and a very considerable weight of authority, should not be lightly abandoned.
To briefly recapitulate: The court in this case expressly holds that
the provisions of the Jury Commissioners Act, under which procedure
Lieber was indicted "makes no reference to the number of grand jurors to be drawn and certified." Therefore, the fact that over twenty19

United States v. Breeding, 207 Fed. 645 (1913).

This is an excellent case

and cites fully many ancient and modem authorities in support of the position
taken by Judge McDowell. Also, there is included a list of the number of jurors
summoned in the various federal districts. The numbers summoned in the thirtyeight districts polled were: "over 23," called in S districts; 23-30, called in 15
districts; 30-40, called in 13 districts; over 40, five districts, including the Southern
District of New York (New York City district), where from 50 to 75 were called.
In the Northern District of Illinois the practice under Judge Landis was to
summon 45 to 50 men; and under Judge Carpenter 30-35 men were called.
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three were summoned does not violate the Jury Commissioners Act,
which act applies here. But it is said that section 16 "provides that a
panel of a grand jury must contain twenty-three persons. That requirement is not changed by any provision of the Jury Commissioners
Act." It hardly appears just why the Jury Commissioners Act would
have to change the number impanelled in order to permit a certain
number to be summoned,--a wholly different thing.
20
To sustain their contention, the court cites People v. Onahan.
Quoting from that case: "Both grand jury and petit jurors must be
summoned and impanelled in such counties, so far as regulated by
law, as before the passage of the act in question." That case was decided in 1897. And at that time sections 4 and 5 of the Jury Commissioners Act were in effect. 21 Those sections did not relate to "summoning and impanelling"; nor did any other sections of the act
construed in People v. Onahan. These sections have been repealed,
however, by the very section 9 of the Jury Commissioners Act quoted
in full earlier in this note. And section 9 dearly relates to "summoning and impanelling." However, if this construction be true, the court
in the Lieber case says "the act would be clearly invalid." It would
be invalid because "It was only because the act was construed as not
conferring additional powers upon the courts or judges in counties
of over 250,000 and because the practice of such courts was not
changed that the court sustained the act." 22
The decision in People v. Onahan could be construed, it is believed, to hold, that since the clerk still selects out of the jury box,
and the same officer, the sheriff, still summons the jurors, no change
is made in the practice of the courts by the addition of Section 9 of
the Jury Commissioners Act, and hence the construction urged by the
people could be correct, and still be constitutional. It is held in Miller
20

171 Ill.
449, 48 N. E. 1003 (1897).

21

J. & A. Ill.
Stat. Ann. (1913), §§ 6859, 6860.

22 The court, in People v. Onahan, op. cit. supra note 20, said: "Section 22
(of the Constitution), so far as is claimed to apply here provides: 'The general
assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated
cases, that is to say: For .. .regulating the practice in courts of justice . ..summoning and impanelling grand or petit jurors.'" As to this, the court said: "We
are of opinion that this statute is not a local or special law, within the meaning of
the Constitution. 48 N. E. 1003, 1006. Another constitutional provision was discussed in People v. Onahan: "Section 29 provides that 'all laws relating to courts
shall be general, and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all courts of the same class or grade . . .shall be
uniform.'" The court held that the only additional power was that of appointment of commissioners, and no substantial change was really made: "The same
officer, the clerk of the court, draws the names of the jurors from the jury box,
and they are summoned .. .in the same manner as under the previous law," that
is, by the sheriff.
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v. The People 23 that the selection of a grand jury is not a matter
affecting the jurisdiction of the court.
To conclude this first section, then, it would seem that the statutes
do not place a restriction on the number to be ordered for a grand
jury, though the number to be impanelled is fixed. This may be unfortunate, but it appears to be statutory. As is said in People v. Munday,2 4 a case where the presiding judge ordered fifty names to be
drawn by the jury commissioner for a special grand jury: "The proceeding was under the Jury Commissioners Act, applicable to Cook
County

. .

. There is no express direction in the statute as to the num-

ber to be ordered."
A second ground of objection to the procedure followed in the
Ideber case was based by the majority opinion upon the power which
the judge exercised in selecting, from those called, those who were to
sit on the grand jury. No question is made as to motives of the judge;
the point is solely that his conduct was in error. It will be recalled
that when the list came before the Chief Justice of the Criminal Court
thirty-one prospective jurors were on hand. After interrogation, the
Chief Justice excused six of these men. Then followed the colloquy
quoted earlier in this note whereby the names were drawn out of a
hat by the clerk, and the men whose names the clerk drew became
the grand jurors.
The objections made by the majority opinion in the principal case
to this procedure follows: "Section 9 of the Jurors Act (Cahill's 1931
Stat. ch. 78, p. 1752) provides that whenever a grand jury 'shall be
required by law or by the order of the judge' the county board shall
'select twenty-three persons . . . to serve as grand jurors at such
terms' . . . It.is apparent that whether the grand jury is required

'by law' or by order of the judge... they are to be 'selected' not by
the judge but by the county board. Under this act the court or the
judge therefore has nothing to do with selecting the grand jury, by
lot or otherwise . . . Nothing in any part of the Jury Commissioners

Act authorizes the judge, upon the appearance of grand jurors before
him, to draw from them, by lot or otherwise, a grand jury, as section
9 thereof makes that the exclusive duty of the clerk, to be performed
only in the office of the jury commissioners 'in the presence of the
persons named in section 8 of this act.'"
Section 9 of the Jurors Act and section 9 of the Jury Commissioners Act are the sections which it was sought to show earlier in this
note as mutually conflicting so far as Cook County is concerned;
23

24

183 IH. 423, 56 N. E. 60 (1899).
204 Ill. App. 24 (1919).
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and it will be remembered that they both provide for the mechanics of
selecting men from the general jury lists to be summoned for jury
service.
The only limitation found upon the character of the men to be
so summoned is found in section 9 of the Jurors Act, 2 5 where it is required that men be selected "possessing the qualifications as provided in
section 2 of this act . . ." The statutory qualifications referred to are
that the jurors selected be a proportionate number from the residents
of each town, or precinct, and: "First-Inhabitants of the town, or
precinct, not exempt from serving on juries. Second-Of the age of
twenty-one years, or upwards, and under sixty-five years old. ThirdIn the possession of their natural faculties, and not infirm or decrepit.
Fourth-Free from all legal exceptions, of fair character, of approved
integrity, of sound judgment, well informed, and who understand the
English language."
These are the only restrictions placed upon the jurors selected by
the boards or commissioners. When we reflect that in the Lieber case
one of the men so "selected" was, it developed, dead, it must be apparent that this selection by the boards or commissioners, is, especially
in Cook County, a mere blind drawing.2 6 Nevertheless, the real contention of the majority opinion here seems to be that the court had no
power to excuse a grand juror for any cause whatever. In other words,
the court had no authority to excuse any juror, of its own motion, even
though the man upon appearance was quite apparently one of the type
barred by the statutes as being unqualified to serve, as the jurors "are
to be 'selected' not by the judge but by the county board . . . the
judge therefore has nothing to do with selecting the grand jury." If
this contention is correct, then it would follow that if twelve of the
grand jurors had testified that they had formed and expressed opinions that the defendant was guilty, and that they should vote in favor
of an indictment without any regard to the evidence, the court would
have no power to excuse them of its own motion. Suppose it was
brought to the attention of the court that twelve of the jurors had
been bribed to free a certain accused, the court would have no power,
authority, or jurisdiction to excuse the culprits. These illustrations are
merely interposed to show by an appeal to logic that the judge must
have some power to excuse jurors called.
Not only logic, but authority, supports the view that while the
actual selecting of the names to be called is up to some one other than
25

Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931)

26

See "Selection of Grand Jurors" in the Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago,

C. 78, § 9.

1929) at p. 231, where it is said that "the grand juries frequently have been
mediocre and have not had the mental capacity required for satisfactory service of
this kind."
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the judge, the judge has the power on his own motion, to excuse a
man appearing for jury service, for cause shown.
Corpus Juris says on this point: 2 7 "The rule is generally laid down
apart from statute for any good cause shown and in furtherance of
justice the court has the right, in the exercise of its sound discretion
on its own motion, without challenge from either party, to discharge
or excuse a grand juror at any time before he is sworn. In the absence of a showing that the complaining party has been prejudiced
thereby, the exercise of this discretion is not reviewable . . . . In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that the court
acted with sufficient and legal cause in excusing or discharging one
called to serve as a juror."
The Illinois case of Stone v. The People 28 asserts that the judges
of the Illinois courts have common law powers, one of which, as shown
above, is the right to excuse jurors on their own motion. There the
court said that the statutes have not "taken away the common law
powers of the circuit courts, which, as we have by express statute
adopted the common law of England, they undoubtedly possess." 29
The court in the Lieber case seems to hold, however, that the
provisions of the Jurors Act, section 9, and of a similar section of the
Jury Commissioners Act, have deprived these courts of their powers'
in this regard. This, it is respectfully suggested, violates a fundamental
rule of statutory construction, namely that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed,30 especially, -itwould
seem, when to give the statutes an unnecessarily broad interpretation
would lead to the undesirable results pointed out in the hypothetical
cases mentioned.
The third point of the majority opinion in the Lieber case was
that the irregularities in summoning and selection resulted in actual
and substantial injustice to the defendant Lieber, and therefore he
was entitled to a reversal.
In effect at the time of the trial was a curative section applicable
to the Jury Commissioners Act under which the jury in the Lieber
case was summoned. This statute provides: 3 ' "No objection, exception, or challenge to any petit juror or grand juror or to any panel
of petit or grand jurors shall he allowed at any time because of any
failure to comply with the provisions of this act or of the said rules,
unless the party urging the same shall show to the court that actual
27
28

"Grand Juries," 28 C. J., p. 794.
Op. cit. supra note. 17.

29

The statute adopting the common law is a typical one. See Smith-Hurd Ill.

Rev. Stat. (1931) C. 28.
30

31

People v. Taylor, 342 Ill.
88, 174 N. E. 59 (1930).
Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1933) C. 78, § 35.
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and substantial injustice has resulted or will result to him, because
of the error or defect charged."
The majority opinion in the principal case refers to this Act lnd
then says: "But the record here shows that plaintiff in error has been
tried and convicted under an illegal indictment. This in itself, if allowed to stand, would amount to actual and substantial injustice to
him and be a denial to him of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions."
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Clyde E. Stone, with
Justice Frederic R. DeYoung concurring, says in regard to this reasoning: 32 "The majority opinion states that the plaintiff in error has
shown substantial injury. It says he was injured because the indictment was not according to law and because he was indicted by this
grand jury, which it said was not a legal grand jury. Ordinary rules
of logic will scarcely afford the privilege, however, of using the conclusion sought to be established as proof of the contention made.
There is no showing that the jury was prejudiced or that it did not
fairly consider the evidence . . ."

With the dissenting judges' view the remedial statute would seem
to accord, for the act quite clearly contemplates the possibility of noncompliance with the rules set out for the summoning of the jurors,
without such irregularity being a substantial injury to the defendant.
With all due respect to the majority opinion, it must be admitted
that it is hard to see how the indictment can be illegal and void because of an irregularity in the summoning and impanelling the grand
jury which returned the indictment, unless it is shown that the ir,
regularities worked substantial harm to the defendant, or at least
shown that the grand jury, when impanelled, was completely without
power to act, and hence all of its acts were void.
Delaying the question of substantial injury for a moment, was this
jury completely without power to act because of a defect in the method
of impanelling and summoning the jurors? If it was completely
without power to act, then the indictment must be admitted to be
simply a nullity, and hence even pleading to it would not waive its
33
defects.
Thus we come squarely to the question of the legality of a grand
jury which is not selected in accordance with the statute. We will forget for the time being what has previously been said in an attempt
32

See partial report in Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1934.

Waiver of defects does not apply to cases where, because of a fundamental
defect, the grand jury is without jurisdiction to act. People v. Gray, 261 Ill. 140,
103 N. E. 552, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1215 (1913); People v. Munday, 293 I1. 191,
127 N. E. 364 (1920); People v. Jones, 263 Ill.
564, 105 N. E. 744 (1914) ; People
v. Strauch, 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126 (1910).
33
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to show this grand jury was not improperly selected, since the procedure was apparently in accord with the statutes and common law applicable to the particular jurisdiction involved, and we will assume that
the Act of 1874 still applies to Cook County when it says in section
9: "It shall be the duty of the county board.., to select twenty-three
persons . . . to serve as grand jurors."
As is said in 10 American and English Annotated Cases, at page
964, in a note on this subject: "The numerous decisions passing upon
the legality of a grand jury not selected according to the statute,
though they are not uniform in upholding the legality of such a grand
jury, are not necessarily conflicting. Each case turns upon the extent
to which a particular statutory provision may be departed from with.
out affecting the legality of the grand jury. State v. Beckley, 79 Iowa,
368, 44 N. W. 679. This is determined chiefly by the character of the
statute, that is, whether it is mandatory or directory, which in this instance depends more upon the purpose of the statute than upon its
language."
In the Lieber case the majority opinion holds: "This court has held
that the statutory method of securing a grand jury is mandatory.
(Marsh v. People, 236 Ill. 464.) No mandatory provision of the statute can be waived or disregarded on grounds of expediency."
A distinction may be found in the cases, both in Illinois and in
other jurisdictions, between the binding force of various parts of the
one statute, holding that while one provision is mandatory, another
may be merely directory. For instance, in the case of U. S. v. Ambrose 84 it is held that while the general statute as to the formation
of a grand jury is "mandatory," still "all that is required is an honest
intention to conform to the statute. .

.

. Beyond that it is merely

directory." In the case before the court the venire had been issued
by the wrong judge; the district attorney had not made application
for the venire; the jury box did not contain 300 names as required
by statute; all grand jurors called were not qualified to serve; the
venire was not signed by the clerk as required by law; and all of the
jurors were not drawn from the body of the district, but came from a
nearby section. Yet the court held that the various provisions that
had been violated were merely directory. The court, in holding the
indictment valid, said: "Whatever occurs in regard to the constitution of a grand jury, is really a matter of very little importance to
the defendant. . . I therefore regard any defect in the organization,
summoning, and impanelling . . . in a very different light."

In the Ambrose case it was specifically decided that the statute was
mandatory when viewed as a whole, and in so holding it reflected the
34

3 Fed. 283 (1880).
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general Federal rule. 35 Yet, the court held, parts of the statute were
directory merely, and if an honest attempt was made to follow the
statute, that was sufficient. This is likewise the general Federal rule.86
It will be recalled that the majority opinion quoted the Illinois
case of Marsh v. People 37 as holding that the statutory method of
securing a jury was mandatory. That case presented the question
whether an indictment found by a grand jury that had not been
selected at a regular or special meeting of the county board was a
valid indictment, and it was held that it was not. In a later case,
People v. Donaldson,38 the Marsh case was relied on to support an
objection to the indictment where the grand jury that returned the
indictment was selected by the county board 19 days before the first
day of the term of court, when the statute expressly provides: "It shall
be the duty of the county board, at least twenty days before the sitting of the court, to select twenty-three persons . . . to serve as grand
jurors.3 9 The court in the Donaldson case held that the statutory
"duty" imposed was directory merely, and since this "duty" is the very
"duty" which is undergoing construction in the Lieber case, it would
seem the "duty" imposed as to number of jurors can be viewed as
directory likewise.
The Marsh case, relied on in the majority opinion in the principal
case, is very fully considered by Judge Vickers in the Donaldson case,
and the proper interpretation of the case is presented in these words
by the learned judge: "That case is distinguishable from the one at bar
in that in the Marsh case thegrand jury had been selected by the county
board when it was not convened in regular session, and therefore had
not power to select a grand jury. In the present case, the county board
was regularly convened and had full power to exercise the function of
a county board, and the most that can be said against the validity of
its act in selecting the grand jury is that the power was irregularly
or erroneously exercised. The holding in the Marsh case is based on a
total want of power in the county board to select a grand jury or do
or perform any other official act. There a portion of the members of the
county board came together, not in a regular or special meeting, but as
individual members of the board, and assumed to perform the official
work of the county board, which could only be performed when the
board was in session. That case is not like the case at bar. There is
some language in the Marsh case which, if not construed in connection
35

Sharp v. U. S., 138 Fed. 878, 71 C. C. A. 258 (19o5).

"In the federal courts it has been decided that the fact that more than
the common law number were summoned is immaterial, and does not affect the
validity of an indictment." "Grand Juries," 28 C. J., p. 781.
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464, 80 N. E. 1006 (1907).
255 Ill.
19, 99 N. E. 62 (1912).
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with the matter then before the court, might lead to some support to
the plaintiff in error's conclusion. It is said in that case at page 472
of 226 Ill., at page 1009 of 80 N. E.: 'It would be the adoption of a
dangerous policy, and one liable to be productive of much evil, to lay
down the rule that public officers may disregard the plain provision
of the statute directing them as to the manner of discharging their
official duties, and hold that their acts performed in disregard of the
statutory requirements would be. as valid as if those requirements had
been observed.' The language above quoted was not intended to apply to every possible omission of public officials to follow the letter
of the statute. If so understood and applied, all statutes imposing
duties upon public officers would be held to be mandatory . .. it was
not intended in that case to hold that every statutory requirement
concerning public officers is a matter stricti juris and to be obeyed to
the very letter, under no less penalty than having the entire action of
such officers declared void. The general rule is that, where a statute
specifies the time within which a public officer is to perform an official
act regarding the rights and duties of others, it will be considered as
directory, merely, unless the nature of the act to be performed or the
language used shows that the designation of time was intended as a
limitation of the power of the officer." Later in the decision the court
in the Donaldson case quotes with approval Hugkes v. State, 40 where
it is said: "If a grand jury regularly selected, without any notice
whatever, were returned into court, impanelled, sworn, and charged,
then the subsequent proceedings would not be irregular merely because they had not been summoned according to a directory statute.
The object of the statute is to get the grand jury into court. When
that purpose is accomplished, its force is at an end."
Looking at both the Marsh case and the Donaldson case, one would
be led to believe that the statutes in Illinois in regards to selection of
jurors and their impanelling are mandatory in regards to some provisions, and directory merely as to others, and this would seem to be
a rule commended by sound reason and good authority. The test as
to what provisions are mandatory and what ones are directory is
based on what was intended by the statute, not merely what words are
used; 41 and statutory intention may be drawn from a consideration of
the purposes for which the statute was enacted; 4z and particularly
54 Ind. 95 (1876).
41 Note, 10 Am. and Eng. Ann. Cases 964. Also, see Turner v. State, 78 Ga.
174 (1886), where a statute saying "not less than 18 nor more than 30 names"
is held to be directory merely.
42 People v. Donaldson, op. cit. supra note 38; Hughes v. State, op. cit. supra
note 40; Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 494 (1876); Yunker and Marshall v. Daly,
65 IlI. App. 667 (1895); 10 Ency. of Pl. and Pr., p. 362.
40
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what injury will result to the defendant if the provision in question
48
be disregarded.
A review of the decided cases in Illinois will, it is believed, show
that if there is a restriction in the statute to calling but twenty-three
persons which is applicable to Cook County, that provision is directory
merely, not mandatory, and that when it is simply a question of irregularity in proceedings, the party aggrieved must show substantial
injury or complete disregard of a provision designed for his protection,
before he will be entitled to a new trial.
The first type of non-compliance with the statute that will be considered is found in that class of cases which deal with situations where
the effect of the non-compliance is to deprive the actors of all power
to act. In this class the Marsh case is the leading case. There the fact
that the county board did not meet as a board deprived it of all
authority to act at all. In the case of People v. Boston 44 the jury list
was not selected by the board at all, but by individual members not
acting as a board. The court held that the action so had was a nullity,
and all acts done by a jury selected without authority were void, if the
lack of authority be as complete as was shown here. Substantially the
same was the case of People v. Cochran.45 In that case a committee
of the county board, not the board at all, purported to act without
any control over their actions by the board as a body, and the acts
so done were held to be without authority. In both of the last two
cases it was specifically held by the court that mere irregularities do
not invalidate the jury list, but substantial compliance with the statute was necessary. Obviously, there was not even a shadow of compliance in any of the cases, and, as is very pointedly remarked in the
case of People v. Donaldson, the holding in these cases is based upon
a total want of power, and not upon an irregularity in the exercise of
power, as was the fact in the Lieber case.
A second type of noncompliance with the statute includes those
cases where the provision disregarded was one inserted in the statute
for the protection of the accused, and it is held that a disregard of
48 People v. Donaldson, op. cit. supra note 38; People v. Wallace, 303 Ill.
504, 135 N. E. 723 (1922); Wistrand v. People, 213 I1. 72, 72 N. E. 748 (1904);
Yunker and Marshall v. Daly, op. cit. supra note 42; Matthews v. Granger, 96
Ill. App. 536 (1900); Weir v. Sanitary District, 160 Ill. App. 174 (1911); People
v. Coffman, 338 Ill. 367, 170 N. E. 227 (1930); Barron v. People, 73 Ill. 256
(1874); Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 69 (1876); People v. Boston, 309 Ill. 77,
139 N. E. 880 (1923); People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 145 N. E. 207 (1924);
People v. Colegrove, 342 Ill. 430, 174 N. E. 536 (1930); People v. Stevens, 335
Ill. 415, 167 N. E. 49 (1929) ; People v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264, 137 N. E. 845 (1922);
Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N. E. 431 (1892).

44

Op. cit. supra note 43.

45

Op. cit. supra note 43.

NOTES
such a statute is reversible error. In People v. Green 46 the jury was
selected solely from the city of Alton, and not from the body of the
County of Madison, as required by statute, and the court held that
the provision violated was meant for the protection of the accused and
was important, so it was error to deny him .the wider distribution. In
People v. Lembke 4 7 there was a complete disregard of the provisions
of the statute in two particulars. No attempt was made by the county
board to make a selected list of 100 persons for each term, and the
practice was followed of selecting 6% instead of the 10% required by
statute.
Apart from the fact that historically the locality from which one's
grand jurors were called has always been of far more importance than
the number that were to be summoned, since the original jury, as introduced into England by the Normans, was a "body of neighbors" convened to give their decision, not on the evidence placed before them,
but "upon their knowledge of the person, the circumstances, and the
locality," 48 it should be noted that the court in both of the last two
cases clearly stated that not all noncompliance with the statute would
make a grand jury's acts illegal. In the Lembke case it is said: "When
all of the substantial provisions of sections 1 and 2 of the statute on
jurors are violated, and it is clearly shown that such violations are
substantial and amount to a denial of trial by jury according to the
law of the land, such denial to a defendant is reversible error." Thus
it is clear that the court would not condemn a mere irregularity in
the number summoned, without it being shown that the violation was
substantially harmful to the defendant. In the Green case the court
refers to the case of Barron v. The People 49 a case in which only 19
were returned, instead of 23, and quotes with approval the decision
that this was a defect "more formal than real, not affecting the real
merits" and not a sufficient defense.
The two elasses of cases exemplified by the Marsh case and the
Lembke case, respectively, do not include the principal case, where
the defect in summoning is not a case of a total lack of power to
act,50 nor a violation of a substantial provision designed for the protection of the accused. 51

48

329 Ill.
576, 161 N. E. 83 (1928).
320 Ill.
553, 151 N. E. 535 (1926).
Complete Statutes of England, Vol. 10, p. 45.

49

Op. cit. supra note 43.

46
47

People v. Donaldson, op. cit. supra note 38.
51 Barron v. The People, op. cit. supra note 43. Also see 1 Bishop's New
Criminal Procedure, § 875: "A qualified and competent grand juror, if irregularly
drawn, may with his fellows find an indictment to which the defendant cannot
object, for he has no interest in the manner of drawing."
50
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Therefore, it is submitted that the error, if it be such, made in the
Lieber case falls into that large class of cases where the defect alleged is a defect of form rather than of substance. There is no doubt
but that such a class does exist, and by the very fact of their existence
they negative the idea that letter-perfect compliance with the statute
in every detail is mandatory.
In Beasley v. People,52 a murder case, only twenty-two persons
answered, and the court went on to hearing without ordering another
one to be summoned, though the statute provides that "if for any
reason, the panel of the grand jury shall not be full at the opening
of such court, the judge shall direct the sheriff to summon ... a sufficient number of persons . . . to fill the panel." 53 The statute was
clearly not followed to the letter, as no attempt whatsoever was made
to fill the panel. As to the effect of noncompliance, the court said:
"That depends upon the construction that shall be given to this clause
of the statute-whether it shall be held to be mandatory or only
directory. Reading the word shall as may, as is allowable from the
context, it is simply directory. That is plainly its meaning."
People v. Birger 54 was a case where the grand jurors were not
summoned by the sheriff in the proper manner, as he is enjoined to
do by Section 9 of the Jurors Act. The court said: "Mere irregularities
in impanelling a grand jury, not affecting the competency of any of
the members, will not vitiate their action."
In Barron v. The People,55 a case decided under Section 9 of the
Jurors Act, only 19 jurors were returned. The court said: "The proper
practice doubtless is, and such is the requirement of the statute, and
of this special venire, that 23 persons shall be summoned." Yet the
court held that this provision was directory merely, not mandatory,
and that the defect, "At best, is more formal than real, and section
9 of the Criminal Code provides that no motion in arrest of judgment,
or writ of error, shall be sustained for any matter not affecting the real
merits of the offense charged in the indictment."
Thus it appears that the provisions of section 9 of the Jurors Act
which relate solely to the number, manner, and time of summoning
the jurors have uniformly been held to be directory merely, and it is
respectfully submitted that the duty violated in the Lieber case, if it
be held that section 9 still applies to Cook County, in spite of the
Jury Commissioners Act, was a directory duty merely, and, as said
in the Beasley case, the "shall" really amounts to no more than "may."
89 Ill.
571 (1878).
53 Smith-Hurd IR. Rev. Stat. (1931) C. 78, § 9. It is in this same section 9
that the provision for drawing twenty-three (the issue in the Lieber case) is found.
54 329 II. 352, 160 N. E. 564 (1928).
55 Op. cit. supra note 43.
52

NOTES
That statutes as to the number to be summoned are directory merely is supported by the numerical weight of authority in the United
States.5 6
In a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth: v. Brown, 57 it is said that
the general rule is that mere irregularity in the proceedings by which
a juror gets on the panel does not affect the validity of his action.
There the court said: "Nearly all the cases in which verdicts or indictments have been set aside rest upon an absolute disqualification
of a juror." 58
In Dolan v. People,59 a New York case, Judge Earl said: "The
precise number is fixed by statute for no purpose of benefit or advantage to the person who may be presented for indictment. The sole
object of requiring this number is to secure the attendance at court
of a sufficient number to constitute a grand jury. If more or less
should be drawn no harm would be done any accused person, provided a sufficient number of qualified jurors were drawn and impanelled."
In State v. Knight 60 eighty-five were drawn instead of seventy-five,
as provided by statute. The court said: "There is here no error, nor
semblance of any."
Huling v. State 61 presented the case of a drawing of forty more
than were required by statute. The court said: "The provisions of law
for the selection, distribution, and drawing of jurors should be regarded as directory, rather than as mandatory and indispensable."
In State v. Watson 62 more than the statutory number were drawn.
The court reviewed prior decisions which said that "The plain commands of a statute should never be neglected," and that "These details should be strictly followed," and the court itself said: "We desire to express our decided disapprobation of the too frequent nonobservance of the regulations in respect to the preparation and revision of the jury list and the drawing of jurors." Yet the court plainly held that "The regulation in question is only directory" and it was
proper to refuse a motion to quash.
56 The following cases hold the statutes to be directory merely: Middleton v.
State, 183 Pac. 626 (Okla. 1919); Atkinson v. State, 137 Miss. 42, 101 So. 490
(1924); Parus v. District Court, 42 Nev. 229, 174 Pac. 706, 4 A. L. R. 140 (1918);
State v. Mallard, 184 N. C. 667, 114 S. E. 17 (1922); King v. State, 90 Tex. Cr.
Rep. 289, 234 S. W. 1107 (1922); State v. Leatherwood, 26 N. Mex. 506, 194 Pac.
600 (1922); State v. Price, 92 W. Va. 542, 115 S. E. 393 (122).
57 147 Mass. 585, 18 N. E. 587, 9 Am. St. Rep. 736 (1888).
58 Citing Doyle v. State, 17 Ohio 222 (1848); State v. Cole, 17 Wis. 674

(1864)59

60

61
62

64 N. Y. 485 (1876).
19 Iowa 94 (1865).
17 Ohio St. 583 (1848).
104 N. C. 735, 10 S. E. 705.
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In Corpus Juris 63 the effect of calling more than the required number is considered, and cases are cited holding the statutes to be directory. 64 One case, Leathers v. State,65 is cited, which holds that the
statute in this regard is mandatory. However, as is shown in Turner
v. State,66 the Mississippi statute, under which the Leathers case was
decided, is expressly mandatory, and thus it occupies a peculiar position not applicable to the Illinois statute. In the Turner case the
court held a Georgia statute providing for "not less than 18 nor more
than 30 names" to be directory merely, as "the makers of it never
dreamed that the prisoner should quash a charge against him because the judge drew a few more than thirty and thus expedited the
rotation of service."
From a consideration of the Illinois cases, and those from other
jurisdictions, it appears that the court could, with all justification in
logic and authority, hold the requirement for selection of twenty-three
men to be directory.
It is uniformly held in the cases cited that violation of a directory
statute is not to be considered ground for reversal unless substantial
injury be done the accused by the violation. The Illinois cases clearly
support this rule.
In the case of Weir v. Sanitary District of Chicago 67 it was held
that the fact that the jury list was not in strict compliance with the
law, also the failure to draw the panel at the proper time, also the
failure to summon a second panel from the body of the county, will
not reverse (challenges to the arrays having been overruled) in the
absence of a showing that the challenger was compelled to accept objectionable jurors. It was said: "A challenge to the array will not be
sustained where it is not also shown that an injury has resulted in
consequence of the refusal of the court to quash the panel." 68
Failure to serve summons on those selected for grand jury service
in the proper manner was held, in People v. Wallace,6 9 not to subject
the indictment to attack in the absence of any attempt to show that
the substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced thereby.
63
64

"Grand Juries," Vol. 28, at p. 779.
Logan v. State, 50 Miss. 269 (1874); Bloom v. Price, 44 Miss. 73 (1870);

State v. Connell, 49 Mo. 282, (1872) ; State v. Welch, 33 Mo. 33 (1862); State
v. Bleekley, 18 Mo. 428 (1853).
65 26 Miss. 73 (1853).

66 Op. cit. supra note 41.
67 160 Ill. App. 174 (1911).
68 Citing Wilhelm v. People, 72 Ill. 468 (1874); Mapes v. People 69 Ill. 523
(1873) ; People v. Madison County, 125 Ill. 334, 17 N. E. 802 (1888); Siebert v.
People, 143 Ill. 571 (1892).

69

303 Ill. 504, 135 N. E. 723 (1922).

NOTES
The fact of failure to copy the list into the record, as required by
law, was held not to be fatal in People v. Colegrove,7 0 the court saying: "Mere irregularities in failing to comply strictly with statutory
provisions, if not prejudicial, will not invalidate the list of jurors.
People v. Cochran, 313 Ill. 508, 145 N. E. 207; People v. Boston, 309
Ill. 77, 139 N. E. 880. A verdict will not be set aside because a challenge to the array of jurors is overruled unless the record shows that
substantial rights of the defendant were thereby impaired. People v.
Stevens, 335 Ill. 415; 167 N. E. 49; People v. Corder, 306 Ill. 264,
137 N. E. 845; Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N. E. 431."
Siebert v. People 71 was a case where the regular panel of petit jurors had been exhausted, and the court ordered the clerk to draw the
names of 100 additional jurors, instead of having the sheriff summon
talesmen, as required by Revised Statutes of 1891.72 Proper motions
were made to quash on each of the three successive days upon which
the court committed this same error. The Supreme Court, on review,
held the act of court was "irregular, and not in strict conformity with
the statute"; yet it did not amount to reversible error, in the absence
of any showing that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.
Another petit jury case, People v. Madison County,73 presented this
question: The array was challenged on the ground that they had not
been drawn by the clerk as required by the statute, but had been
drawn by the sheriff. There it was held that even if it be assumed that
the jury was obtained irregularly, a challenge to the array will not
be sustained where it is not also shown that a positive injury had been
sustained in consequence of the refusal of the court to quash the panel.
It is to be noted that no stricter rule, surely, should be applied to a
74
grand jury case than to a petit jury case.
As a final case in point, mention must be made of the case of
People v. Munday.7f, There the head-note asserts the rule that a general order of the criminal court to the clerk to draw from the grand
jury box the names of 50 persons to serve as grand jurors, and the
compliance of the clerk therewith, do not render the grand jury so
drawn illegal.
Therefore, because the error, if it be conceded to be such, in drawing more than the statutory number would seem to be a violation of
a directory statute merely, and not such a violation as would make the
indictment illegal in the absence of proof of substantial injury to the
70
71
73

342 111.
430, 174 N. E. 723 (1930).
143 Il.571, 32 N. E. 431 (1892).
C. 78, § 13.
125 IMI.
339, 17 N. E. 802 (1888).

74
75

U. S. v. Ambrose, 3 Fed. 283 (1880).
Op. dt. supra note 33.
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plaintiff in error, Lieber, it is respectfully submitted that the fact of
substantial injjiry is the thing to be proved, and since no such actual
proof was shown, Lieber neglected to justify his appeal, especially in
view of the two curative statutes in Illinois aimed to prevent reversals
on the ground of error which was without prejudice. 76
Justice Stone of Illinois, in his dissent to the majority opinion in
the Lieber case, says: "In my opinion a decision so fraught with
disastrous consequence should be based upon law and compelling reason. There is no reason or basis in the law of criminal jurisprudence
nor justice to say that an indictment returned in the regular manner
by this jury should be declared null and void."
William T. Kirby.

NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY

OF MANUFACTURERS

AND

VENDORS

OF

CHATTELS.-The general rule, established in the case of Winterbottom
v. Wright,' is that the manufacturer, vendor or contractor is not liable
to third persons who have no contractual relation with him for negligence in the construction, manufacture or sale of articles he handles.
Judge Sanborn, in Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co.,2 recognizes
the general rule and classifies three exceptions. The first is "that an
act of negligence of a manufacturer or vendor which is eminently dangerous to the life or health of mankind, and which is committed in the
preparation or sale of an article intended to preserve, destroy or effect
human life, is actionable by third parties who suffer from the negligence." The leading case in support of this exception is Thomas v.
Winckester.3 The plaintiff recovered from a wholesale druggist who
negligently labeled Belladonna, a deadly poison, "extract of dandelion,"
so that the plaintiff took the poison by mistake. Cases in accord stand
on the well established principles that (a) everyone is bound to avoid
acts or omissions imminently dangerous to the lives of others and (b)
an injury which is the natural and probable result of negligence is
actionable.
76 Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931) C. 78, § 35, and C. 38, § 719. The
first curative statute is quoted in full earlier in this note (see note 31); and the
second curative statute was applied to a case similar to the Lieber case in Barron
v. People, op. cit. supra note 43.
1 10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
2 120 Fed. 865 (1903).
3 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852). In referring to this and similar cases,
Professor Harper says: "It will be noticed that . . . the vendor or manufacturer is
not only failing to warn those liable to be harmed by the dangerous article sold,
but he is affirmatively misleading them by causing them to believe that the
article is safer than it actually is." Harper, Law of Torts 106.

NOTES
Another exception to the general rule is "that an owner's act of
negligence which causes injury to one invited by him to use the defective appliance upon the owner's premises may form the basis of an
action against the owner." 4 Bright v. Barnett & Record Co.5 was
an action for damages for the death of a workman caused by a fall
from defective staging. It appeared that the defendant company had
agreed to put up a suitable staging for the employees of another company to work on. The court held that, while the contract was not made
with deceased, the defendant was liable on its implied invitation to
him to walk on such defective staging while at work.
The third exception to the rule is "that one who sells or delivers
an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb
to another without notice of its qualities, is liable to any person who
suffers an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated, whether there were any contractual relations between the
parties or not." This exception is illustrated by the case of Lewis v.
Terry6 where a folding bed represented as safe, but known to be
otherwise, caused an injury to a guest of the purchaser. The guest
was allowed to recover. So where a threshing machine was s6ld with
a defective cylinder which was necessarily used by those operating
was injured thereby
it to walk upon and an employee of the purchaser
7
he was allowed recovery from the manufacturer.
In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.8 the principle was laid down
that the manufacturer owes a duty to employ reasonable care in
manufacturing or assembling chattels which, while not necessarily
dangerous if properly constructed, constitute a menace or danger to
life and limb if not carefully made, and this duty is owed not only
to his immediate vendees but to any person likely to be harmed by
the defective article, while the same is being lawfully used for the
purpose intended. In the MacPherson case plaintiff was injured when
an automobile which he had purchased from a retail dealer collapsed
as a result of a defective wheel. The defendant was the manufacturer
of the automobile but not of the defective wheel. It appeared that if
the defendant had used due care in inspecting the wheel before the
car was assembled the defect would have been discovered. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff. Prior
to this case, "it had usually been held that an affirmative obligation
4 Coughtry v. Globe Woolen Co., 56 N. Y. 124 (1874). The basis of this rule
seems to be the fact that the supplier has a pecuniary beneficial interest in the
use of the chattel by the third person.
5 88 Wis. 299, 60 N. W. 418 (1894).
6 Ill Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398, 31 L. R. A. 220, 52 Am. St. Rep. 146 (1896).
7 Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (1903).
8 217 N. Y. 383, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696 Ann. Cas. 1916C, 440
(1916).
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to use care in manufacturing an article applied, so far as persons other
than the immediate vendee were concerned, only to manufacturers of
articles which were 'inherently dangerous' to or which were designed
to 'affect' life and limb. This limitation, never supported by any rational considerations, has been definitely abandoned by the more liberal courts." 9
The principle of the MacPherson case has been applied by some
courts in favor of anyone likely to be harmed by a defective automobile.' 0
In referring to the MacPherson case, Professor Harper says: "The
test is not whether the article is dangerous when carefully constructed
but, whether it is likely to cause serious bodily harm if carelessly
made."" But in Parsier v. Wappler Electric Co.12 the complaint
alleged that the defendant manufactured and sold to one Geiser a
machine which they knew was to be used by him in treating persons
for the removal of superfluous hair, and the defendants knew that the
machine when so used would cause injuries, severe pain and distress.
A motion was made under the rules of Civil Practice to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. The Supreme Court of New York denied the motion, the court
saying, after referring to the MacPherson case: "It cannot be that
the defendants would be liable, if the dangerous character of the
machines were due to negligence in their construction, and yet would
not be liable if the machine were to their knowledge dangerous though
constructed with due care and without negligence." So the test, in
such cases, is not only whether the article is dangerous when carefully contructed but also whether it is likely, to the manufacturer's
knowledge, to cause serious bodily harm, even if carefully made.
In the recent case of Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corporation 13 an interesting distinction was made with respect to the principle laid down in the MacPherson case. Here defendants, manufacturers of trucks, had sold one to plaintiff's employer. While the plaintiff was on the truck one of the door handles gave way causing a door
9 Harper, Law of Torts, § 106; Heckel v. Fort Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385,
28 Atl. 322, 39 A. L. R. 989 (1925); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 216
Fed. 878, 8 A. L. R. 1033 (1919). Contra: Ford Motor v. Liberty, 160 Pac. 901
(Okla. 1916); Lewis V. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398, 53 Am. St. Rep. 146
(1896); Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S. W. 421
(1912); Standard Oil Co. v. Munary, 119 Fed. 572 (1902).
10 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W. 855, 60 A. L. R. 357
(1928) (Holding that the seller
of a second hand automobile who represented it to
be in proper operating condition was held liable to pedestrian injured by the automobile while it was being operated with defective brakes.)
11 Harper, op. cit. supra note 9.
12 260 N. Y. S. 35 (1932).
13 268 N. Y. S. 545 (1933).

NOTES
to open suddenly and, as a result the plaintiff was thrown under the
truck. The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed, on appeal to the Supreme Court. The tendency of the modern decisions is to enlarge,
especially the liability of the manufacturer of automobiles while this
case seems to restrict it. It is difficult to see any difference in principle
between an automobile with a defective wheel and one with a defective
door latch for each one is likely to produce serious harm to the oc.
cupants of the car when being lawfully used for the purpose intended.
The dissenting opinion by Justice O'Malley seems to follow the modern
trend in regard to hidden defects.
Granville P. Ziegler.
WILLs-ExEcUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ORAL CONTRACTS TO
DEViSE-LEGAL AND EQUITABLE REmEDIEs.-The Court of Appeals of
Ohio, in the recent case of Struble v. Struble,l held -that where an oral
contract to devise property by will has been made, and the devise not
made, that the remedy of the injured party is an action at law for
damages, and that remedy only. The petitioner alleged that his father
entered into a verbal agreement with him, by the terms of which, it
was provided that if the son would move into his father's home, live
with him, care for him, and furnish and provide his father with a comfortable home as long as his father lived, Clarence, the son, upon the
death of his father, should have all of the property he had left. Clarence fully performed his side of the agreement, but his father died
without doing anything to cause Clarence to receive the property.
The petitioner asserted that his services were reasonably worth $7,200,
for which amount he prayed judgment. The court rendered judgment
for the plaintiff for the amount stated after a deduction of $2,000 as
a remittur. No doubt was entertained by the court as to the plaintiff's right to recover damages, since that right had been established
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Newbold v. Michael.2
But the court unequivocally stated that the petitioner had only his
remedy at law to recover his just compensation for his services, and
that the services rendered were not of such peculiar character and
nature that they could not be measured by pecuniary standards, and
that specific performance could not be decreed.
Admittedly the plaintiff made a gross error, unless he had a reason
for so doing not deducible from the report, in assessing his damages,
for by so doing he admitted that the services rendered could be
measured monetarily. But even considering this admission it is hard
to understand how the court could have stated that this was the only
1

182 N. E. 48 (Ohio 1932).

2

144 N. E. 715 (Ohio 1924).
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remedy that the plaintiff had. We are constrained to the view that the
plaintiff could have brought specific performance of the oral contract,
and that such a prayer should have been answered in the affirmative.
Of course the plaintiff's right to specific performance would be in
grave danger of becoming ensnared in the Statute of Frauds. But
powerful and just as that statute may be it must yield to the equitable
rights of the parties when such rights might be impaired by a too
rigid construction of the statute.
The problem involves a consideration of oral contracts to devise
and written contracts to devise. Where the contract is in writing there
is no difficulty as far as the Statute of Frauds is concerned, as has
been held in the case of Emery v. Darling.3 But the matter of specific
performance and a decree for such is one that is discretionary with
the court since the one who prays for such a decree addresses himself
to the "judicial discretion" of the court. 4 But this discretion must be
within settled rules of equity and cannot depend upon the whim or
caprice of the judge.5 "Discretionary within the settled rules of equity"
-that proposition leads to a necessary minor premise that when
equitable rights would be thwarted by a failure to decree specific performance such a decree should be rendered. And so the case of Allen
v. Hayes 6 has held that where the contract is in writing, is certain
and just in its terms, and is for a valuable consideration, and there is
not an adequate remedy at law, and its enforcement will not injure
either party, a decree of specific performance is a matter of right.
The first section of the Statute of Frauds that must be dealt with
is section 4, which states that a contract which is not to be performed
within a year must be in writing. Our case seems to, on the surface,
fall into that category in that it may appear that the contract in question was one not to be performed within a year, but it is stated in
Snyder v. French,7 and it is universally held, -that an agreement to devise or bequeath property is not within that clause of the statute which
requires an agreement not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof to be in writing, as the death of the person specified
may occur within that year.
A more serious and difficult question is presented in that section of
the Statute of Frauds which mandatorily asserts that any contract for
the sale or transfer of real property must be in writing. The contract
33 N. E. 715 (Ohio 1893).
4 Note, 65 A. L. R. 7, 8.
5 Note, 65 A. L. R. 7, 9.
6 309 I1. 374 (1923). See also: Port Clinton Ry. Co. v. Cleveland R. Co.,
13 Ohio St. 544 (1862); 65 A. L. R. 28, and cases cited.
7/ 111 N. E. 489 (Ill. 1916). See also: Frost v. Tarr, 53 Ind. 390 (1876);
Ewing v. Richards, 8 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 357 (1882); Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y.
560 (1875).
3

NOTES
made by the deceased with his son, in the principal case, specified
"all my property"; so no other conclusion can be reached than that
both real and personal property were meant by this stipulation. In
the case of Sleeth v. Sampson 8 it was held that a contract to give a
mortgage is a contract for the sale of "interest in real property," and
is therefore within the Statute of Frauds. Working from that premise,
established by the highest court of New York, one must necessarily
come to the conclusion that our contract falls into the same category.
And it has been held in Preston v. Casner9 that a contract to make
a testamentary disposition is a contract for the sale of land and
hence must be in writing to conform to the Statute of Frauds.
The only remaining section of the Statute that must be considered
is section 17, which makes it necessary for contracts for the sale of
goods, wares, and merchandises to he in writing. But, as stated in the
Michigan Law Review,' o a contract to bequeath personalty is not a
contract for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandises. Thus our
problem is one wrapped up in the transfer or realty since personalty
and realty are treated alike in testamentary devises.
Confronted with this situation we now have to find a way to take
this contract out of the statute. It has been held that where a person
has rendered services for his father for several years upon the faith of a
promi se to devise and bequeath property to him, there was a sufficient
part performance as to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds."
Statutes in a few jurisdictions provide
that an agreement to make a
12
will must be in writing to be valid.
Just what will constitute sufficient part performance is a question
upon which there is a diversity of opinion, but a long line of cases
hold that where the consideration for a promise to devise land' is the
rendition of services of such a nature or peculiar character that it is
impossible to estimate their value to the promisor by any pecuniary
standard, the rendition of such services is a sufficient part performance
to take the contract out of the operation of the statute. The case of
Dalby v. Maxwell 13 says that to refuse specific performance in such
8

142 N. E. 355 (N. Y. 1923).

9

104 Ill. 262 (1882). See also: Flowers v. Poorman, 87 N. E. 1107 (Ind.

1909); Russell v. Briggs, 165 N. Y. 500 (1901); Knoch v. Williams, 52 N. W.
257 (Wis. 1892).
10 24 Mich. L. Rev. 749, and cases cited.
11 Davison v. Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. 246 (N. J. 1861). See also: Sharkey v.
McDermott, 4 S. W. 107 (Mo. 1887); Carney v. Varney, 8 S. W. 729 (Mo. 1888).
12 See: Barlow v. Barlow, 124 N. E. 285 (Mass. 1919); Howe v. Watson,
60 N. E. 415 (Mass. 1901); Trout v. Ogilvile, 182 Pac. 333 (Cal. 1919).
13 91 N. E. 420 (Ill. 1910) (In this case the defendant and the deceased had
entered into an oral contract whereby the defendant was to live with, care for,
etc., the deceased, and the latter was to leave by will to the defendant all his
property both real and personal The will was never made. The court held that
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a case and leave the promisee to such relief as can be obtained by
him in an action at law would enable the promisor thereby to perpetrate a fraud under the protection of the Statute of Frauds. Pomeroy, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, 14 says that if equitable
fraud be taken as the basis of the doctrine of part performance and
the impossibility of restoring the complainant to the situation in
which he was before the contract was made, the rendering of services,
for a long term of years, the value of which cannot be estimated by
any pecuniary standard, must be considered an act of part performance of the highest standard.
In the case of Lovett v. Lovett, 15 where one party had contracted
to execute and leave at her death a will devising all property she
should then own to a second party and not to revoke the will, and
so executed the will, but later threatened to revoke it, the court
granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from breaking the contract. If an injunction can be granted for a threatened breach of such
a contract, is it not consistent that specific performance of the contract will be decreed when the breach does occur? We think it is.
The case of Newbold v. Mickeal 16 which the Ohio court relies on
to establish their right to award damages to the plaintiff, has in it a
suggestion of the principles which we have tried to emphasize, but
yet the court refused to recognize that specific performance would lie
for the breach of the contract made by the deceased with the present
petitioner. Not unmindful, therefore, that the court was right in awarding the plaintiff damages in this case since he had estimated them and
thus estopped himself from praying for a decree of specific performance, we cannot accede to the proposition intimated in the decision
that such would be the only remedy in cases falling into the same
category.
Donald F. Wise.
specific performance of the contract should be decreed, saying that specific performance of a contract to will all the decedent's property in consideration of the
defendant's assistance will not be withheld because the contract is oral. The
Statute of Frauds cannot be resorted to, to perpetrate a fraud.). See also: Purcell
v. Corder, 33 Okla. 68 (1912); Coughanour v. Grayson, 19 Idaho 255 (1911);
Owens v. McNally, 45 Pac. 710 (Cal. 1896); Laird v. Vila, 100 N. W. 656 (Minn.
1904); Berg v. Moreau, 97 S. W. 901 (Mo. 1906); Bryson v. McShane, 35 S. E.
848 (W. Va. 1900) ; Best v. Gralapp, 96 N. W. 641 (Neb. 1903) ; Quinn v. Quinn,
58 N. W. 808 (S.D. 1894).
14 § 1409 b.
15 157 Ind. 104 (1927).
16 Op. cit. supra note 2. It was held, in this case, that equity will not enforce specific performance of a verbal agreement to leave an estate including real
and personal property to another by will, in consideration of personal services,
unless the character of the services were not intended to be and not susceptible
of being measured by pecuniary standard, or unless the contract has been so far
executed that a refusal would operate as a fraud upon the party who has performed and would result in a denial of just compensation.

